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THE WORLD TRADE CENTER DISASTER: 
HEALTH EFFECTS AND COMPENSATION 
MECHANISMS 
John Howard, M.D., J.D.* 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 2001, terrorists hijacked and flew a Boeing 
767-200 aircraft (American Airlines Flight 11) into the North 
Tower of the World Trade Center (“WTC”) in downtown 
Manhattan at 8:46 a.m. local time and a second Boeing 767-200 
aircraft (United Airlines Flight 175) into the South Tower at 9:02 
a.m. Within two hours, both of the twin towers (1 WTC and 2 
WTC), and later 7 WTC, collapsed killing 2,752 people,1 including 
343 firefighters from the Fire Department of New York City 
(“FDNY”).2 Those who perished in the WTC disaster died from 
consequences of major trauma, massive building collapse, life-
terminating burns, overwhelming smoke inhalation and falls from a 
great height. 
The WTC disaster triggered a massive emergency response 
                                                           
 *Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and 
Coordinator, World Trade Center Health Programs, United States Department of 
Health and Human Services, Washington, D.C. The findings and conclusions in 
this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health or the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services. 
1 Phil Hirschkorn, New York Reduces Death Toll by 40, CNN, Oct. 29, 
2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/10/29/wtc.deaths/. 
2 David J. Prezant et al., Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness in 
Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 806, 809 
(2002) [hereinafter Prezant et al., Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness]. 
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involving thousands of early-arriving responders and volunteers—
both previously trained volunteers and “spontaneous” or 
“unaffiliated” volunteers. Many of these responders escaped from, 
or witnessed the collapse of, the WTC Twin Towers. Thousands 
of later-arriving responders and volunteers engaged in search and 
rescue activities to free those who were trapped in the rubble of the 
collapsed towers. Over the ensuing days and months, many more 
thousands of responders and volunteers from all over the United 
States worked tirelessly in activities involving the recovery and 
cleanup of the WTC site and the streets, residences and commercial 
buildings in Lower Manhattan; the transport of debris to barge 
stations located along the west side of Lower Manhattan; the 
receipt and handling of debris at the Staten Island Landfill; and the 
forensic examination of human remains at the New York City 
(“NYC”) Medical Examiners Office.3 From the time of the collapse 
until the last fire at the WTC site was extinguished on December 
20, 2001, responders—and others in the nearby residential and 
commercial building communities—were exposed to debris, dust 
and smoke composed of several different types of hazardous 
substances.4 
During their heroic service in responding to the WTC disaster, 
and during the years following the WTC disaster, some of those 
involved in rescue, recovery and cleanup efforts, and some nearby 
residents and other building occupants, including school children 
and school staff, have developed new or worsened aerodigestive 
and mental health-related illnesses. 
This article provides a summary of the medical and legal issues 
that the occurrence of adverse health effects following the WTC 
disaster have generated. Part I of the article summarizes the nature 
of WTC exposures and the populations exposed to debris, dust and 
smoke from the WTC collapse. Part II of the article describes the 
health effects seen in WTC responders (rescue, recovery and 
cleanup workers and volunteers), residents, building occupants and 
                                                           
3 Philip Landrigan et al., Health and Environmental Consequences of the 
World Trade Center Disaster, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 731, 731, 733 
(2004). 
4 Id. 
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passersby, students and school staff. Part III of the article 
summarizes the mechanisms used to compensate the losses 
sustained by individuals and businesses as a result of the WTC 
disaster, including charitable giving, government aid, insurance 
payments and tort awards. 
I. EXPOSURES 
The combustion of 90,000 liters of jet fuel at high temperatures 
led to the weakening of the WTC’s structural steel members and 
within two hours resulted in their dramatic collapse.5 The collapse 
of the towers pulverized the cement exterior of two of the largest 
buildings in the United States as well as much of their interior 
contents.6 The energy of the collapse, together with the prevailing 
winds from the west, immediately dispersed a dense plume of 
debris, dust and smoke over a wide area of Lower Manhattan and 
into western Brooklyn.7 After the collapse, debris from the twin 
towers formed a six-story pile of rubble which was referred to as 
Ground Zero or, simply, the Pile.8 Demolition and removal of 
thousands of tons of debris began in October 2001 when the fires 
at Ground Zero became less intense.9 Fires continued to smolder, 
generating toxic combustion products, until December 20, 2001.10 
Collapse of the WTC towers resulted in an intense, short-term 
exposure to a rapidly dispersing plume consisting of both 
                                                           
5 Steven Ashley, When the Twin Towers Fell, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 
ONLINE, Oct. 9, 2001, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?articleID=000B7 
FEB-A88C-1C75-9B81809EC588EF21&sc=I100322. 
6 Landrigan et al., supra note 3, at 731. 
7 Landrigan et al., supra note 3, at 734. 
8 “The ‘Pile’ was the name used by the site rescue, recovery and removal 
workers to describe the colossal amount of debris after the attacks. The workers 
avoided using the name ‘Ground Zero,’ which describes the location on the 
ground where any explosion occurs, but it nonetheless became synonymous 
with the World Trade Center site.” See Wikipedia.org, World Trade Center 
Site, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Trade_Center_site (last visited 
November 8, 2007). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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particulate and gaseous contaminants affecting a large number of 
people in Lower Manhattan and western Brooklyn.11 Within days, 
both the composition and the intensity of this initial, short-term 
exposure event changed into a more sustained contact, involving re-
suspended dust particles from rescue and recovery activities and 
gases from the slow combustion of debris.12 These later exposure 
events were of particular concern for all exposed persons, including 
responders, residents, building occupants, students and school staff 
living and working in proximity to Ground Zero. 13 
WTC exposures can best be understood as a temporal sequence 
of five exposure categories of varying intensity.14 The first 
exposure category occurred during the first 12 hours after the 
collapse, during the most intense exposure to rescuers, residents, 
commercial building occupants and people in transit and when they 
were exposed to the highest concentration of large and small 
particles and various gases.15 The second exposure category 
occurred twelve hours after the collapse up to the first rain on 
September 14, 2001 at which time WTC-affected groups were 
exposed to large and small particles that were periodically re-
suspended, as well as to gases which were emitted from intense 
fires at Ground Zero.16 The third exposure category consisted of 
the time period from September 15, 2001 until the second rain on 
September 25, 2001, when exposure to re-suspended particles and 
gases lessened because of the rain but still continued at a lower 
level of intensity.17 The fourth exposure category encompassed the 
                                                           
11 Paul J. Lioy & Panos Georgopoulos, The Anatomy of the Exposures 
That Occurred around the World Trade Center Site: 9/11 and Beyond, 1076 
ANN. OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 54, 55 (2006). 
12 Id. at 56–57. 
13 Luz Claudio, Environmental Aftermath, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 11, 
A529–A536 (2001). 
14 Paul J. Lioy et al., The World Trade Center Aftermath and Its Effects 
on Health: Understanding and Learning through Human-Exposure Science, 40 
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 6876, 6878–85 (2006) [hereinafter Lioy et al., WTC 
Aftermath and Its Effects on Health]. 
15 Id. at 6878–79. 
16 Id. at 6879. 
17 Id. 
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time period from September 26, 2001 until the fires were 
extinguished in late December 2001, when smoke continued to be 
emitted from fires at Ground Zero but gradually lessened in 
intensity, and when particle re-suspension occurred only in debris 
removal and transport activities.18 The fifth exposure category is 
the time period from September 11, 2001 to present, when settled 
dust in indoor spaces can be disturbed by cleanup and building 
demolition and reconstruction activities.19 
During these five periods of exposure, WTC-affected 
populations sustained varying, but largely unknown, levels of 
exposure to a long list of toxic agents generated by the collapse of 
the WTC.20 Among these were asbestos fibers (from insulation and 
fireproofing materials); concrete and the crystalline silica it 
contained (made from Portland cement and used in the Towers’ 
construction); carbon monoxide (from fires and engine exhaust); 
diesel particulates (from vehicle engine exhaust); mercury (from 
fluorescent lights); heavy metals such as aluminum, titanium, 
chromium, zinc and manganese (from building materials and 
furnishings); hydrogen sulfide (from sewers, decomposing human 
remains and spoiled foodstuffs); inorganic acids; volatile and semi-
volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”); polynuclear aromatic 
hydrocarbons (“PAHs”); polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”); 
polychlorinated dioxins (“PCDDs”) and furans (“PCDFs”); 
various pesticides; and other toxic agents.21 
A.  Settled and Airborne Dust 
Characterization of the settled and airborne dust generated by 
the WTC collapse has been reported in several different studies 
conducted by both public and private parties.22 Despite being quite 
                                                           
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 6879. 
20 K. McKinney et al., Occupational Exposures to Air Contaminants at the 
World Trade Center Disaster Site—New York, September–October, 2001, 51 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 453, 453 (2002). 
21 Id. 
22 See, e.g., Claudio, supra note 13, at A528; Paul J. Lioy et al., 
Characterization of the Dust/Smoke Aerosol that Settled East of the World 
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encyclopedic, many of these studies do not provide a quantitative 
picture of individual or even group exposure levels because, on the 
day of the disaster when the most concentrated exposures 
occurred, no air-sampling monitors were operating close to the 
WTC site “to characterize and quantify pollutants in the dust 
cloud.”23 Some general estimates do exist. For instance, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency estimated that levels of airborne 
dust around the WTC site immediately after the collapse ranged 
from a level of 1,000 to greater than 100,000 micrograms per cubic 
meter.24 Most studies note significant surface contamination; the 
amount of dust particles that coated surfaces after the WTC 
collapse ranged from 1-3 centimeters (“cm”) indoors to more than 
10 cm outdoors.25 
Most of the settled dust was composed of construction 
materials such as pulverized cement, wallboard, office furnishings 
and glass fibers.26 More than 95 percent by weight were composed 
of large particles (particle diameters of greater than 10 µm and up 
to 50 µm), but 1 to 4 percent of particles were small enough (less 
                                                           
Trade Center in Lower Manhattan after the Collapse of the WTC 11 
September 2001, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 703 (2002) [hereinafter Lioy et 
al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC]; Landrigan et al., supra 
note 3, at 112; John K. McGee et al., Chemical Analysis of World Trade 
Center Fine Particulate Matter for Use in Toxicologic Assessment, 111 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSP. 972 (2003); Kenneth Wallingford & Erin Snyder, Occupational 
Exposures During the World Trade Center Response, 17 TOXICOLOGY AND 
INDUS. HEALTH 247 (2001); NAT’L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ASSESSMENT OFFICE OF 
RESEARCH AND DEV., EPA, Exposure and Human Health Evaluation of 
Airborne Pollution from the World Trade Center Disaster (External Review 
Draft), EPA/600/P-2/002A (2002), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/CFM/ 
recordisplay.cfm?deid=54667 [hereinafter Exposure Evaluation]. 
23 Stephen H. Gavett, World Trade Center Fine Particulate Matter—
Chemistry and Toxic Respiratory Effects: An Overview, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 971 (2003). 
24 Exposure Evaluation, supra note 22, at 30. 
25 Lioy et al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC, supra note 
22, at 712. Even though the measured levels of contamination appear small and 
on the surfaces of objects only, such levels do, however, represent the potential 
for significant respiratory exposure when such contamination is re-suspended by 
prevailing winds or human activity. Id. 
26 McGee et al., supra note 22, at 972. 
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than or equal to 2.5 µm in diameter) to travel deep in the lungs, 
where their deposition has been associated with adverse 
cardiovascular and respiratory health effects.27 Exposure to these 
harmful small particles was not constant as air concentrations at 
several different locations in Manhattan show a series of peaks and 
valleys during different times in September and October of 2001.28 
These particles are usually deposited in the nasal passages, but 
when exposures are intense—as in the first 12 hours of the WTC 
disaster—or individuals engage in mouth breathing (as opposed to 
nasal breathing), large particles can be deposited farther down the 
respiratory tract.29 
From the perspective of potential damage to the lung tissues, a 
critical finding about particle composition and chemistry was that 
both coarse and fine particles were found to be highly alkaline in 
nature with a pH of greater than 7.0 to over 11.0—levels of 
alkalinity that are corrosive to the cells lining the respiratory 
tract.30 
The published studies of settled and airborne dust also include 
samples of specific toxins that are known to cause long-term health 
effects, such as cancer and chronic scarring (or fibrosis) of the 
lungs.31 Because cancer-causing asbestos was used as fire insulation 
in the construction of the North Tower up to the 40th floor,32 it is 
not surprising that samples of the material coating the collapsed 
steel beams verified that the coating contained 20 percent by 
                                                           
27 Lioy et al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC, supra note 
22, at 707. 
28 George Thurston et al., Identification and Characterization of World 
Trade Center Fine Particulate Matter Air Pollution at a Site in Lower 
Manhattan following September 11, 14 EPIDEMIOLOGY S87, S88 (2003). 
29 Lioy et al., WTC Aftermath and Its Effects on Health, supra note 14, at 
6880. 
30 Lioy et al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC, supra note 
22, at 707. 
31 WILLIAM N. ROM & STEVEN MARKOWITZ, ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE (Lippincott, Williams & Wilkin eds., 4th ed. 
2006). 
32 W.B. Reitze et al., Application of Sprayed Inorganic Fiber Containing 
Asbestos: Occupational Health Hazards, 33 AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS’N J. 
178, 180 (1972). 
HOWARD FINAL FOR AUTHORIZATION 3.DOC 2/11/08 9:25 PM 
76 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
volume of chrysotile asbestos.33 Asbestos fibers were also found to 
represent from 0.8 to 3.0 percent by weight of settled dust.34 
Despite being detected in settled dust, only 22 of several thousand 
air samples taken during the earliest days after September 11, 2001, 
revealed a concentration of asbestos fibers greater than the upper 
limit of 70 fibers/square millimeter established in the Asbestos 
Hazard Emergency Response Act (AHERA).35 Particles of 
crystalline silica were found in all but one of twenty-seven settled 
dust samples taken with concentrations by weight ranging from 0 
to 18 percent (median of 3.2 percent), but silica particles that could 
be inhaled into the lungs were not detected in any of 18 air 
samples.36 
Undoubtedly, individual exposures to asbestos fibers, 
crystalline silica, and other cancer-causing agents took place 
following the WTC collapse, but it is very difficult to 
quantitatively document such exposure retrospectively since 
contemporaneous records of individual breathing zone exposures 
were not made. Also, an estimated 100 to 1,000 tons of cancer-
causing PAHs were spread over a localized area of Lower 
Manhattan.37 Air sampling for PAHs during the first two months 
after September 11, 2001 revealed levels greater at Ground Zero 
than in other areas of Manhattan, but those levels declined between 
September 11 and December 20, 2001 as the fires subsided.38 
Levels of PCBs, PCDDs and PCDFs were found in a detectable 
                                                           
33 ROGER N. CLARK ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES OF THE WORLD 
TRADE CENTER AREA AFTER THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ATTACK, U.S. 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, OPEN FILE REPORT OFR-01-0429 (2001), available at 
http://geology.cr.usgs.gov/pub/open-file-reports/ofr-01-0429/. 
34 Lioy et al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC, supra note 
22, at 707. 
35 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Response to September 
11, http://www.epa.gov/wtc/asbestos/ (last visited May 1, 2007). 
36 K. McKinney et al., supra note 20, at 454. 
37 J.H. Offenberg et al., Persistent Organic Pollutants in the Dust That 
Settled across Lower Manhattan after September 11, 2001, 37 ENVTL. SCI. & 
TECH. 502, 507 (2003). 
38 Joachim D. Pleil et al., Air Levels of Carcinogenic Polycyclic Aromatic 
Hydrocarbons After the World Trade Center Disaster, 101 PRO. OF THE NAT’L 
ACAD. OF SCI. 11685, 11686 (2004). 
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range, but not at an excessive level.39 
Finally, much more is known about the particulate—the solid 
phase—component of the WTC exposure than is known about the 
gaseous component, particularly during the first 12–24 hours of the 
disaster when testing for gases was not conducted. Volatility and 
lack of persistence in the environment prevented anyone from 
characterizing exposures to inorganic and organic combustion 
products that would have resulted from the intense temperatures, 
vaporization of the thousands of liters of jet fuel, and large 
amounts of polyvinyl carbon (plastic) inside the towers and which 
were all gaseous components of the initial plume.40 
B.  Personal Sampling and Respirator Use 
Significant efforts were made by numerous public and private 
entities beginning from September 11, 2001 and into 2002 to 
promote the use of respiratory protection equipment or respirators 
by responders. The FDNY, the NYPD, the Port Authority, the 
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”), 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(“NIOSH”), the New York State Department of Labor (Division of 
Safety and Health), WTC contractors and subcontractors, and 
other parties provided respirator fit testing and actively encouraged 
responders to wear their assigned respirators.41 However, the use 
of respirators in the first weeks after September 11th has generally 
been judged as less than optimal.42 For instance, the FDNY has 
noted that the frequency of respirator use among firefighters 
immediately after the attacks was in the 20 percent range but rose 
to 60 percent after October 2001.43 
                                                           
39 Lioy et al., Dust/Smoke Aerosol after Collapse of the WTC, supra note 
22, at 712. 
40 Landrigan et al., supra note 3, at 731. 
41 Landrigan et al., supra note 3, at 732. 
42 Landrigan et al., supra note 3, at 732. 
43 David Prezant, M.D., Chief Medical Officer, Office of Medical Affairs, 
Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) and Co-Director World Trade 
Center Medical Monitoring and Treatment Program, Presentation at Fire 
Department of New York City: Fire Department of New York City Rescue 
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Sub-optimal use of respiratory protection equipment during the 
initial stages of the rescue operation may have occurred for several 
different reasons.44 First, a supplied air respirator, like a self-
contained breathing apparatus (“SCBA”) which firefighters wear 
for routine rescue activities, is designed to be worn for only short 
periods of time, but the rescue efforts lasted much longer than any 
previous rescue operation.45 Second, the weight and bulkiness of a 
SCBA made work in the cramped debris spaces at Ground Zero 
quite difficult.46 Third, the filters of non-SCBA type respirators 
used during rescue and recovery at Ground Zero, like air purifying 
respirators (“APRs”), quickly became clogged with dust after just a 
few minutes in the highly dusty environment of Ground Zero, 
making them impossible to breathe through.47 Fourth, APR filters 
were not—at that time—interchangeable between respirators made 
by different manufacturers, which created difficulties in replacing 
clogged filters.48 Ensuring proper respirator use is a challenge 
during large scale disasters and even when respirators are available, 
their effectiveness may be less than optimal. For instance, a study 
of respirator use in response to Hurricane Katrina also found sub-
optimal respirator use.49 
There are only a few studies of personal breathing zone 
sampling in responders and none of residents or other exposed 
populations. In one study conducted from September 18 through 
October 4, 2001, over 1,200 bulk and air samples were collected 
and analyzed for asbestos, carbon monoxide, diesel exhaust, 
hydrogen sulfide, inorganic acids, mercury and other metals, PAHs, 
                                                           
Workers, October 2001 to October 2002 (Dec. 18, 2006) (presentation on file 
with the author). 
44 BRIAN A. JACKSON ET AL., PROTECTING EMERGENCY RESPONDERS: 
LESSON LEARNED FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS 22–24 (2002), available at 
http://rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF176/. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Kristen J. Cummings et al., Respirator Donning in Post-hurricane New 
Orleans, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 700 (2007), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/13/5/06-1490.htm. 
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respirable crystalline silica and VOCs.50 Exposures did not exceed 
published NIOSH Recommended Exposure Limits (“RELs”) or 
OSHA Permissible Exposure Limits (“PELs”), except for one 
worker overexposed to cadmium and another to carbon monoxide.51 
However, widespread and continuous sampling of responders 
working at Ground Zero, especially those actually working at the 
center of the Pile, was not conducted.  
Therefore, precise quantitative characterization of personal 
exposures is not possible for individual members of WTC-exposed 
populations based on the type of data collected at the time of the 
event and immediately afterwards. However, more complete 
exposure assessment is only available during controlled laboratory 
experiments, or planned industrial operations, rather than during 
real world catastrophes like the WTC disaster. Surrogates such as 
time of arrival at the WTC site, time exposed to the plume, 
distance from Ground Zero, and specification of activities involving 
exposure to debris, dust, and smoke could be used as semi-
quantitative determinants of exposure.52 Future studies that aim to 
determine causal inferences between WTC exposures and specific 
health effects will undoubtedly have to use semi-quantitative, or 
even qualitative, surrogates to create plausible exposure categories 
that can clearly distinguish between varying levels of exposure 
among an exposed population (i.e., low, moderate and high) and an 
unexposed group. 
C.  Mental Health Exposures 
In addition to exposures to the toxic substances described 
above, those who witnessed the traumatic events associated with 
the WTC disaster were exposed to a host of mental health 
stressors.53 Exposures which may have caused mental stress 
                                                           
50 Wallingford & Snyder, supra note 22, at 249. 
51 Wallingford & Snyder, supra note 22, at 250. 
52 Lioy et al., WTC Aftermath and Its Effects on Health, supra note 14, at 
6880. 
53 Sandro Galea et al., Psychological Sequelae on the September 11 
Terrorist Attacks in New York City, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 982 (2002). 
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include seeing the hijacked aircraft fly into the WTC towers, 
watching building occupants jump to their death from the upper 
floors of the towers, seeing and hearing the towers collapse, helping 
severely injured victims, and recovering human remains from the 
rubble of Ground Zero.54 
A study of mental health effects performed just two weeks 
following the WTC attacks found that 22 percent of WTC 
responders had acute post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).55 
Studies conducted five and eight weeks after the WTC terrorist 
attacks found that mental health stressors arising from the disaster 
caused depression and PTSD in 7.5 percent and 9.7 percent of 
Manhattan residents, respectively,56 and one study performed one 
year following the attacks found that 13 percent of responders had 
PTSD symptoms.57 
Although it is important to determine for how long mental 
health effects like PTSD persist after a traumatic event, there is a 
dearth of knowledge concerning the persistence of post-disaster 
PTSD.58 Nevertheless, information about the persistence of PTSD 
in WTC responders is emerging. Interviews conducted two to three 
years following the WTC attacks show that the overall prevalence 
of PTSD among WTC responders was 12.4 percent, with the 
greatest risk of developing PTSD found in those responders who 
were not professional rescue personnel, e.g., construction and 
sanitation workers and unaffiliated volunteers.59 
                                                           
54 Id. 
55 Carol S. Fullerton et al., Perceived Safety in Disaster Workers 
Following 9/11, 194 J. OF NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 61, 63 (2006). 
56 Galea, supra note 53, at 983. 
57 R.P. Smith et al., Mental health status of World Trade Center rescue 
and recovery workers and volunteers—New York City, July 2002–Aug 2004, 53 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 812–15 (2004). 
58 Sandro Galea et al., The Epidemiology of Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder after Disasters, 27 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVIEWS 78, 85 (2005). 
59 Megan A. Perrin et al., Differences in PTSD Prevalence and Associated 
Risk Factors Among World Trade Center Disaster Rescue and Recovery 
Workers, 164 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1385, 1385–94 (2007). 
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D.  Exposed Populations 
Soon after the disaster, the New York City Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene began a registry of individuals at risk 
for possible near and long term physical and mental health effects 
from the disaster—the World Trade Center Health Registry (“the 
Registry”).60 
A registry is a traditional public health measure and its 
purposes “can be summarized as collating information collected 
from defined groups over time, which may be used in the 
prevention or treatment of disease, the provision of after-care, the 
monitoring of changing patterns of disease and medical care, and the 
evaluation and planning of services.”61 The first step in establishing 
a registry designed to keep track of those persons at risk of harm 
from a disaster is to determine the number of persons exposed to 
the event.62 In the case of the WTC disaster, the exact number of 
people exposed to the debris, dust, and smoke from the WTC 
disaster is unknown. 
The most complete estimate of significantly exposed WTC 
populations has been performed by the Registry in conjunction 
with the Research Triangle Institute and the Federal Agency for 
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry in the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services.63 The Registry’s estimate of the 
number of individuals in the various WTC-affected populations 
was done to provide a denominator for its study of health effects in 
WTC-exposed persons (i.e., the numerator for calculation of 
incidence rates of new disease or mortality).64 
The Registry defined geographic areas of maximal exposure for 
                                                           
60 World Trade Center Health Registry, available at http://www.nyc.gov 
/html/doh/html/wtc/index.html (last visited on Nov. 9, 2007). See discussion 
infra Part II.E. 
61 J.M. Weddell, Registers and Registries: A Review, 2 INT’L J. OF 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 221, 226 (1973). 
62 Id. 
63 JOSEPH MURPHY, WORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH REGISTRY—
EXPLANATION AND CALCULATION OF OUTCOME RATES (2006), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/wtc/wtc-outcome-explanation.pdf. 
64 Id. 
HOWARD FINAL FOR AUTHORIZATION 3.DOC 2/11/08 9:25 PM 
82 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
each of the major populations exposed to the WTC disaster, i.e., 
responders (rescue and recovery personnel, cleanup workers, and 
volunteers), Lower Manhattan residents, building occupants and 
people in transit, and Lower Manhattan school children and staff. 
The Registry then estimated the number of persons in each major 
population group by defined geographic area.65 
For responders, the Registry defined the WTC site at which 
they were exposed as a geographic area bounded by Chambers 
Street on the North, Broadway on the East, Rector Street on the 
South and the Hudson River on the West (and included the Staten 
Island Landfill).66 For residents, building occupants and people in 
transit, and school children and staff, the Registry used the 
geographic area of Manhattan south of Chambers Street from the 
East River to the Hudson River.67 Using these geographic 
parameters, the Registry estimated a total population-denominator 
of 526,269 exposed persons.68 
Within this total estimated population, the Registry defined 
four major sub-groups: (1) rescue and recovery workers (91,469); 
(2) residents living in the area of Lower Manhattan south of Canal 
Street (57,511); (3) building occupants and those in transit 
(62,092); and (4) students and school staff (K-12) present in the 
area of Lower Manhattan south of Canal Street (15,197).69 
The category of rescue and recovery workers includes people 
who worked at least one shift between September 11, 2001 and 
June 30, 2002 at the WTC site, on debris transport barges, or at the 
Staten Island Landfill.70 The 91,469 estimated responders and 
volunteers can be further divided into 8 categories: (1) 26,659 
persons from NYC government agencies; (2) 26,480 persons from 
volunteer organizations; (3) 20,397 persons from rescue/recovery 
organizations; (4) 8,887 persons from New York State agencies; (5) 
                                                           
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 15. 
69 JOSEPH MURPHY, WORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH REGISTRY—
EXPLANATION AND CALCULATION OF OUTCOME RATES (2006), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/wtc/wtc-outcome-explanation.pdf. 
70 Id. at 1. 
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5,122 persons from federal agencies; (6) 3,499 persons from 
Federal Emergency Management Administration (“FEMA”) urban 
search and rescue teams and disaster medical assistance teams; (7) 
400 persons from the New York-New Jersey Port Authority; and 
(8) 15 non-overlapping labor union members.71  
The lack of an exact list of WTC responders serves as one of 
the most important lessons from the WTC disaster. It is vitally 
important to keep accurate, contemporaneous records that identify 
every individual who is a part of an emergency response effort. 
Accurate and contemporaneous records of each responder enhance 
the effectiveness of post-deployment physical and mental health 
monitoring and treatment. 
II.  HEALTH EFFECTS 
The WTC terrorist attacks created an unprecedented urban 
environmental disaster and exposed emergency responders, 
volunteers, nearby residents, office workers, students, school staff, 
and others to a complex mix of chemical and physical hazards as 
well as psychological traumatogens. 
A.  FDNY Responders 
Nearly the entire FDNY workforce of 11,336 firefighters 
participated in the WTC disaster response.72 Physicians from 
FDNY were present at the WTC site immediately before and after 
the collapse.73 They saw first-hand the immediate health effects: 
                                                           
71 Joseph Murphy et al., Measuring and Maximizing Coverage in the 
World Trade Center Health Registry, 26 STAT. IN MED. 1688 (2007), available 
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/wtc/wtc-article20070207.pdf; 
MELISSA DOLAN ET AL., WORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH REGISTRY: WORLD 
TRADE CENTER HEALTH REGISTRY—SAMPLING BUILDING AND DENOMINATOR 
ESTIMATION (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/ 
pdf/wtc/wtc-buildingdenominator.pdf. 
72 Prezant et al., Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness, supra note 2, at 
806. 
73 Interview with David Prezant, M.D., Chief Medical Officer, Office of 
Medical Affairs, Fire Department of the City of New York (FDNY) and Co-
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orthopedic injuries from falling debris, eye and skin irritation, nasal 
congestion, and difficulty breathing and coughing (dubbed “World 
Trade Center Cough”).74 
In the first 24 hours after the WTC attacks, 240 FDNY 
personnel sought emergency medical treatment.75 Of these, 28 were 
hospitalized and 50 received treatment for acute respiratory 
symptoms caused by inhalation of airborne smoke and dust.76 
Several firefighters had respiratory problems that started within 
hours of the disaster, and they were treated for serious, newly 
onset lung diseases.77 Others had respiratory symptoms that arose 
weeks or months after their work at Ground Zero began.78 Due to 
these early symptoms, FDNY quickly initiated medical screenings 
of their members who responded to the WTC disaster and began 
reporting their findings in the peer-reviewed medical literature.79 
Three weeks following September 11th, FDNY initiated a study 
examining 370 firefighters’ blood and urine (321 of these 
firefighters having had direct exposure to the WTC site) to learn 
whether any of their personnel had internally absorbed any of 110 
potentially fire-related chemicals as a result of being exposed to the 
WTC site.80 Values were generally low compared to reference 
values, but “unanticipated increases in urinary antimony, serum 
                                                           
Director World Trade Center Medical Monitoring and Treatment Programs, in 
Brooklyn, N.Y. (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with David Prezant]. 
74 Id. World Trade Center cough was defined by FDNY Medical Bureau 
“as a persistent cough that developed in a firefighter after exposure to the site 
and that was accompanied by respiratory symptoms severe enough for FDNY 
physicians to place the worker on medical leave for at least four consecutive 
weeks.” See Prezant et al., Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness, supra note 2, 
at 806. 
75 Interview with David Prezant, supra note 73. 
76 Interview with David Prezant, supra note 73. 
77 William Rom et al., Acute Eosinophilic Pneumonia in a New York City 
Firefighter Exposed to World Trade Center Dust, 166 AM. J. OF 
RESPIRIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 797, 799 (2002). 
78 Interview with David Prezant, supra note 73. 
79 Interview with David Prezant, supra note 73. 
80 Philip Edelman et al., Biomonitoring of Chemical Exposures among 
New York City Firefighters Responding to the World Trade Center Fire and 
Collapse, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH  PERSP. 1906, 1907 (2003). 
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heptachlorobenzodioxin and serum heptachlororbenzofuran” were 
seen. 81 
Approximately one month following September 11, 2001, 332 
firefighters in whom severe cough had developed were evaluated for 
the presence of bronchial hyperreactivity. “[B]ronchial 
hyperreactivity . . . was found in 23 percent of firefighters with a 
high level of exposure (77 subjects) and in 8 percent of those with a 
moderate level of exposure (26 subjects).”82 
Also in October 2001, 362 firefighters underwent spirometric 
lung function tests.83 The results of these tests were compared to 
pre-WTC-exposure values obtained during their annual FDNY 
physical examinations.84 Reductions in lung functions were greater 
than the expected annual reductions measured in a reference group 
of FDNY firefighters prior to September 11, 2001.85 Additionally, 
there was a 60 percent increased risk of a decline of greater than 
450 milliliters in forced vital capacity in one second (FEV1) for 
those personnel arriving at the WTC site during the first 48 hours 
compared with a referent group.86 
Ten months after September 11, 2001, FDNY did a study 
comparing sputum87 in WTC-exposed firefighters with a control 
group.88 Findings from exposed firefighters showed an influx of 
inflammatory cells that increased with exposure intensity and the 
                                                           
81 Id. at 1908–09. 
82 Prezant et al., supra note 2, Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness, at 
809. 
83 Debra M. Feldman et al., Symptoms, Respirator Use and Pulmonary 
Function Changes Among New York City Firefighters Responding to the World 
Trade Center Disaster, 125 CHEST 1256 (2004). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 1260–61. 
87 Sputum is a type of respiratory tract secretion which is distinguished 
from saliva by the presence of bronchial epithelial cells and alveolar macrophages 
(cells from deep within the lung). See DENNIS L. KASPER ET AL., HARRISON’S 
MANUAL OF MEDICINE: A DISTILLATION OF CLINICAL MATERIAL FROM 
HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 666 (16th ed. 2005). 
88 Elizabeth M. Fireman et al., Induced Sputum Assessment in New York 
City Firefighters Exposed to World Trade Center Dust, 112 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP. 1564, 1565 (2004). 
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presence of debris, dust, and smoke products generated by the 
WTC collapse.89 Based on these initial findings, and to better 
define the respiratory consequences of WTC exposures, FDNY 
analyzed longitudinal lung function from 1997 through 2002 in the 
entire FDNY WTC medical screening cohort of 12,079 
individuals.90 Results showed that WTC-exposed firefighters 
experienced a substantial reduction (372 milliliters) in average FEV1 
during a single year after September 11, 2001.91 The 372 milliliter 
loss equaled 12 years of age-related decline and the loss in lung 
function correlated linearly with exposure intensity as assessed by 
initial arrival time.92 
Recently, FDNY compared the incidence of firefighters who 
had a “sarcoid-like” granulomatous pulmonary disease in the 15 
years before September 11, 2001 with cases of the same condition 
in the five years after September 11, 2001.93 In the five years 
following September 11th, pathologic evidence consistent with new 
onset sarcoid was noted in 26 firefighters (13 cases were noted in 
the first year after September 11, 2001) for an incidence rate of 86 
cases per 100,000 persons and 13 cases were identified in the 
remaining four years for an incidence rate of 22 per 100,000 
persons.94 An incidence rate of only 15 cases per 100,000 persons 
was noted during the 15 years prior to September 11, 2001.95 
B.  Non-Firefighter Responders and Volunteers 
After receiving reports in late 2001 from physicians seeing 
symptomatic WTC responders other than FDNY members, a 
                                                           
89 Id. at 1569. 
90 Gisela I. Banauch et al., Pulmonary Function After Exposure to the 
World Trade Center Collapse in the New York City Fire Department, 174 AM. 
J. OF RESPIRIRATORY AND CRITICAL CARE MED. 312 (2006). 
91 Id. at 315. 
92 Id. 
93 Gabriel Izbicki et al., World Trade Center “Sarcoid Like” 
Granulomatous Pulmonary Disease in NYC Fire Department Rescue Workers, 
131 CHEST 1414 (2007). 
94 Id. at 1416. 
95 Id. 
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consortium of medical centers in the New York City-New Jersey 
Metropolitan Area—the “Mt. Sinai Consortium”—received federal 
funding to provide one-time medical screening for all non-firefighter 
WTC rescue, recovery, site clean-up workers and volunteers, such 
as police officers, private sector emergency medical services 
workers, construction workers, site cleanup workers and others not 
covered by the FDNY medical screening program.96 
Preliminary reports of physical97 and mental98 health findings 
were published in late 2004 on the first 1,000 responders screened 
by the Mt. Sinai Consortium. These reports indicated a high 
prevalence of physical and mental health problems in responders 
and volunteers, including 60 percent with respiratory symptoms,99 
33 percent with abnormal lung function,100 and 20 percent with 
PTSD.101 
In September of 2006, the Mt. Sinai Consortium reported in 
detail on the physical health effects experienced by medically 
screened responders and volunteers.102 Of 9,442 responders and 
                                                           
96 Consortium members are Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, Queens 
College, State University of New York (SUNY) at Stonybrook, University of 
Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey/Robert Wood Johnson Medical School 
and Bellevue Hospital/New York University School of Medicine. These 
Consortium members provide: (1) periodic physical and mental health 
assessment designed to identify short and longer term health effects that are 
WTC-related; (2) clinical data collection, analysis and reporting to ensure that 
all care provided is evidence-based; (3) scientifically-guided treatment for WTC-
related diseases; (4) translation services in over 20 languages; and (5) assistance 
with filing workers’ compensation insurance claims, health insurance claims and 
pension and disability claims. 
97 Steven Levin et al., Physical Health Status of World Trade Center 
Rescue and Recovery Workers and Volunteers—New York City, July 2002–
August 2004, 53 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 807 (2004). 
98 R. P. Smith et al., Mental Health Status of World Trade Center Rescue 
and Recovery Workers and Volunteers—New York City, July 2002–August 
2004, 53 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 812 (2004). 
99 Levin et al., supra note 97, at 809. 
100 Levin et al., supra note 97, at 809. 
101 Smith et al., supra note 98, at 813. 
102 Robin Herbert et al., The World Trade Center Disaster and the Health 
of Workers: Five-Year Assessment of a Unique Medical Screening Program, 
114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1853 (2006). 
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volunteers seen from 2002 through 2004, 69 percent reported new 
or worsened respiratory symptoms while performing rescue, 
recovery, and cleanup work, and 59 percent reported that the same 
symptoms persisted until the time of examination one to three 
years after exposure.103 Among those without any symptoms 
before beginning their WTC response work, 61 percent developed 
one or more respiratory symptoms while performing WTC 
work.104 
Most importantly, in addition to the subjective symptoms 
reported during medical screening, the study also reported that 28 
percent had objective measures of abnormal lung function.105 
Among nonsmokers, 27 percent had abnormal lung function 
compared to only 13 percent in the U.S. population as a whole.106 
One measure of lung function in nonsmokers—the forced vital 
capacity (“FVC”)—was reduced in screened responders.107 Low 
FVC was found in 20 percent of responders with abnormal lung 
function compared to only 4 percent seen in the general U.S. 
population.108 Both increased symptoms and abnormal lung 
function were associated with early arrival at Ground Zero.109 
Although there are several reasons unrelated to WTC dust 
exposure explaining why a person’s FVC can be reduced, similar 
lung function changes have also been reported by other researchers 
in FDNY responders, thereby providing evidence of biologic 
consistency in similarly exposed populations.110 Such consistency 
in medical findings from studies involving different exposed 
populations of responders contributes to the developing view that 
WTC exposures are associated with serious, long-term lung 
conditions. 
                                                           
103 Id. at 1855. 
104 Id. at 1856. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Robin Herbert et al., The World Trade Center Disaster and the Health 
of Workers: Five-Year Assessment of a Unique Medical Screening Program, 
114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1853 (2006). 
109 Id. 
110 See, e.g., Banauch et al., supra note 90. 
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Adding to the evidence for WTC-associated respiratory effects 
in the responder populations is a study from the WTC Health 
Registry111 published in 2007.112 The study analyzed 2003-2004 
interview data from the Registry for responders who did not have 
asthma prior to September 11, 2001 and estimated the risk of 
newly-diagnosed asthma and its association with WTC work 
history, including use of a mask or a respirator.113 The study 
indicated a relatively high rate of self-reported newly-diagnosed 
asthma, i.e., 927 out of 25,748 responders, or 3.6 percent, reported 
new asthma. Earlier arrival and longer duration of work at the WTC 
site were significant risk factors.114 
C.  Responder Fatalities 
In 2006, the death of police detective James Zadroga, Jr. with 
lung fibrosis at a young age (34 years) was reported in the New 
York City print media and received much attention from the WTC 
responder community as well as the general public.115 After the 
Zadroga death, the media reported several other responder deaths 
from various types of lung diseases and cancers.116 A number of 
these deaths included relatively young, previously healthy 
individuals, thereby raising concerns that WTC exposures caused 
their premature deaths.117 However, from a scientific perspective, 
it is not clear that the reported responders’ cancers and lung 
                                                           
111 See infra Part II.E. 
112 Katherine Wheeler et al., Asthma Diagnosed after September 11, 2001 
among Rescue and Recovery Workers: Findings from the World Trade Center 
Registry, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1584 (2007), available at http://www. 
ehponline.org/members/2007/10248/10248.pdf. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 9-11 In Fight of Their Lives, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 16, 2006, 
available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2006/04/16/2006-04-16_fight 
_for_their_lives.html. 
116 Death Sentence, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 24, 2006, available at 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2006/07/24/2006-07-24_death_sentence. 
html. 
117 Id. 
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diseases are causally related or just temporally related to WTC 
exposures. Nevertheless, the similar pattern of conditions leading 
to their deaths raises a suspicion that the WTC exposures that they 
shared may have caused their deaths. 
To further investigate responder fatalities, the New York State 
Department of Health launched a WTC Fatality Investigation 
Program in December of 2006 to find common patterns among all 
responder and volunteer deaths.118 A systematic surveillance 
system approach is used to collect information on any person who 
volunteered, worked, or responded at the WTC disaster site 
(including Ground Zero and the surrounding area, on the debris 
transport barges, or at the Staten Island Landfill) for at least one 8 
hour shift between September 11, 2001 and June 30, 2002 and who 
died after September 11, 2001.119 The Fatality Investigation 
Program will provide information to improve the medical 
community’s understanding of the deaths occurring in responders 
and to improve the medical treatment of responders.120 
D.  Residents, Commercial Building Occupants, People in 
Transit, School Children, and Staff 
Lower Manhattan is home to many thousands of residents. 
People living in public housing, apartments, co-operatives and 
condominiums near the WTC site experienced an acute and intense 
indoor exposure to dust on September 11, 2001.121 For several 
months afterwards, they experienced persistent exposure to dust 
re-suspended by recovery operations and the activities of daily 
living, as well as exposure to smoke from the fires at Ground 
Zero.122 Dust and smoke gained entrance to residences through 
                                                           
118 New York State Department of Health, WTC Responders Fatality 
Investigation Program, http://www.dos.state.ny.us/fire/WTCpercent20Info/ 
WTCRespondersFatalityInvestigationProgram.doc.pdf (last visited May 1, 
2007). Cases can be reported to WTCFatality@health.state.ny.us or to (518) 
402-7900 or (866) 807-2130. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Landrigan, supra note 3, at A515; Claudio, supra note 13, at A531. 
122 Landrigan, supra note 3, at A515; Claudio, supra note 13, at A531. 
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windows, building cracks, and ventilation systems.123 
Soon after September 11, 2001, researchers at Bellevue 
Hospital, the New York University School of Medicine, and the 
New York State Department of Health initiated surveys to 
determine if there was an increase in the rate of new respiratory 
symptoms in Lower Manhattan residents.124 Within 8 to 16 
months after September 11, 2001, residents within one mile of 
Ground Zero were surveyed about whether they had any new 
onset respiratory symptoms.125 The analysis of nearly 3,000 
residents of Lower Manhattan revealed that 55.8 percent 
(compared to 20.1 percent among residents living five miles away 
from Ground Zero in Manhattan) reported new onset respiratory 
symptoms, such as cough, wheezing, or shortness of breath at any 
time following September 11, 2001.126 These respiratory 
symptoms resulted in an almost two-fold increase in unplanned 
medical visits and use of asthma medication in persons living near 
Ground Zero compared with others.127 The study also addressed 
whether these symptoms were resolved right after the WTC 
attacks or if they persisted by asking whether symptoms were still 
present in the month immediately preceding completion of the 
survey (8 to 16 months after September 11th) with a frequency of 
at least twice per week.128 Newly onset lower respiratory 
symptoms were present in 27 percent of exposed residents versus 
8 percent of controls—a threefold increase in persistent respiratory 
symptoms.129 
In addition to these early self-reports of symptoms in a non-
                                                           
123 Landrigan, supra note 3, at A515; Claudio, supra note 13, at A531. 
124 Joan Reibman et al., The World Trade Center Residents’ Respiratory 
Health Study: New-Onset Respiratory Symptoms and Pulmonary Function, 113 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 406 (2005); Shao Lin et al., Upper Respiratory 
Symptoms and Other Health Effects Among Residents Living Near the World 
Trade Center Site After September 11, 2001, 162 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 
499 (2005). 
125 Reibman et al., supra note 124, at 408. 
126 Reibman et al., supra note 124, at 409, tbl. 2. 
127 Lin et al., supra note 124, at 501. 
128 Lin et al., supra note 124, at 501. 
129 Lin et al., supra note 124, at 501. 
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responder population, there is also clinical evidence of illness in 
residents and others. The WTC Environmental Health Center at 
Bellevue Hospital/New York University School of Medicine has 
medically examined over 1,000 residents, commercial building 
occupants, and cleanup workers.130 Although many of these 
residents and workers were perfectly healthy before the WTC 
exposure, the Bellevue Center has noted that many of the same 
patients now manifest persistent, difficult-to-treat, respiratory 
conditions, such as reactive airways disease and asthma, while 
“others have a process in their lungs that we do not fully 
understand and may consist of a granulomatous disease of the lung 
like sarcoid, or fibrosis, which is scarring in the lungs.”131 These 
survey and clinical findings in residents are remarkably consistent 
with the findings seen in studies of firefighters and other rescue, 
recovery, and cleanup responders. 
E.  World Trade Center Health Registry 
The Registry is the largest effort in the United States to 
monitor the physical and mental health of populations who were 
affected by the WTC terrorist attacks.132 Enrollment eligibility 
includes: (1) people who were south of Chambers Street on 
September 11, 2001 whether in a building, on the street, or on the 
subway; (2) people involved in rescue, recovery, clean up, or other 
activities at the WTC site and/or WTC Recovery Operations on 
Staten Island any time between September 11, 2001 and June 30, 
                                                           
130 Interview with Joan Reibman, M.D., Medical Director, Bellevue/New 
York University School of Medicine World Trade Center Health Center, New 
York, N.Y. (February 4, 2007). 
131 The Long-Term Health Impacts from September 11: A Review of 
Treatment, Diagnosis and Monitoring Efforts, S. Health Educ. Labor and 
Pensions (HELP), 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Joan Reibman, M.D., 
Bellevue Hospital and New York University School of Medicine), available at 
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2007_03_21.html. 
132 Press Release, New York City Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene, World Trade Center Health Registry Surpasses 40,000 Enrollees; It is 
Now the Largest Registry of Its Kind in U.S. History (June 17, 2004), available 
at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/press_archive04/pr071-0617.shtml. 
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2002; (3) students and staff enrolled in schools (pre-kindergarten to 
12th grade) or day care centers south of Canal Street on September 
11, 2001; and (4) people who were living south of Canal Street on 
September 11, 2001.133 Estimates of the true eligible population 
indicate that over 400,000 persons were eligible for a baseline 
health survey questionnaire by the Registry.134 The Registry was 
able to recruit just over 70,000 participants before it closed to new 
registrants in 2004.135 
Like other registries examining risk, the Registry serves as a 
scientific platform to explore evidence of excess mortality in 
populations affected by the WTC disaster as well as the occurrence 
of specific physical and mental health effects in WTC-affected 
populations over time.136 The Registry also serves as an 
information resource for all WTC-affected populations and 
provides clinical guidelines for physicians treating individuals 
exposed to the WTC disaster.137 
The findings reported in early symptom surveys of Lower 
Manhattan residents performed within 16 months of the WTC 
attacks were corroborated by the initial WTC Health Registry’s 
survey of nearly 9,000 survivors of collapsed or damaged buildings 
done 24 to 36 months after the attacks.138 These baseline survey 
findings, published in 2006, concluded that “two or three years 
after September 11th, survivors of buildings that collapsed or that 
were damaged as a result of the WTC attacks reported substantial 
physical and mental health problems” and recommended that long 
                                                           
133 World Trade Center Health Registry, About the Registry, 
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/wtc/about.html (last visited Nov. 9, 
2007). 
134 Murphy et al., supra note 71, at 1688. 
135 Murphy et al., supra note 71, at 1688. 
136 Murphy et al., supra note 71, at 1688. 
137 The New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Clinical 
Guidelines for Adults Exposed to the World Trade Center Disaster, 25 CITY 
HEALTH INFO. 47, 47 (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/ 
downloads/pdf/chi/chi25-7.pdf. 
138 Robert M. Brackbill et al., Surveillance for World Trade Center 
Disaster Health Effects Among Survivors of Collapsed and Damaged 
Buildings, 55 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WLKY. REP. 1, 1 (2006). 
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term follow-up of residents, building occupants, and others 
enrolled in the Registry should be maintained, particularly those 
persons most exposed to the dust cloud.139 
In 2007, the Registry launched a second or follow up survey of 
enrollees to determine whether respiratory and mental health 
symptoms still persist five to six years following the WTC 
collapse.140 
F.  Long Latency Health Effects 
Several of the toxic substances that represent WTC exposures 
are known to cause various types of cancer and lung scarring 
conditions such as asbestosis.141 For some types of cancer and 
asbestosis, the time between exposure and the occurrence of 
symptoms—the latency period—can be quite long. For instance, 
the onset of mesothelioma—a type of lung cancer caused by 
asbestos—can be 20 to 40 years following exposure.142 Given the 
short length of time since the WTC disaster, traditional medical 
theory would not predict the occurrence of most cancers in WTC 
responders and other exposed populations during the early years 
following exposure. Even though there are no scientific reports 
affirmatively linking WTC exposures to cancer, a number of 
responders have unsurprisingly developed cancer subsequent to 
September 11, 2001. What is uncertain from a scientific 
perspective is whether the association between the WTC exposure 
and the subsequent occurrence of cancer is merely temporal or also 
a causal relationship. 
What also complicates the investigation into cancer as a causal 
outcome of WTC exposures is that cancer is a relatively common 
disease and cause of death in the United States; it has been the 
second-leading cause of disease resulting in death since 1960.143 
                                                           
139 Id. 
140 WTC Health Registry 2006–07 Follow-Up Survey, http://www.nyc. 
gov/html/doh/html/wtc/survey.html (last visited on May 1, 2007). 
141 Philip Landrigan, Health Consequences of the 11 September 2001 
Attacks, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A514 (2001). 
142 Id. 
143 Infoplease.com, Deaths by Major Causes, 1960–2004, http://www. 
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The same can be said for any subset of the American population.144 
For instance, cancer occurs frequently among NYC residents, and 
the average rate of cancer increases with age. 145 For males, the rate 
increases fifteen-fold—from a rate of 96.3 cases per 100,000 New 
York male residents aged 35 to 39 years—to a rate of 1500.1 cases 
per 100,000 New York male residents aged 60-64 years.146 Most 
responders at the time of the WTC disaster were probably more 
than 35 years of age and most likely in the 35 to 64 age range.147 
Using the Registry’s estimate of approximately 91,000 WTC 
responders, several cases of cancer unrelated to WTC exposure 
would be expected to develop in the responder population each 
year. 
The same picture can be seen with death or mortality from 
cancer. For instance, among the leading causes of death in NYC 
residents for age groups in which most WTC responders are likely 
to fall—35 to 44 years, 45 to 54 years and 55 to 64 years—cancer 
ranks as the number one cause of death in each of those age 
groups.148 Therefore, since cancer is not an unexpected disease in 
responders age 35 to 65, its temporal occurrence subsequent to the 
WTC disaster is not, by itself, an indication of a causal association 
between WTC exposures and the development of that cancer. Also, 
since cancer incidence and mortality both increase with age, it will 
                                                           
infoplease.com/ipa/A0005124.html (last visited Sept. 8,2007). 
144 American Cancer Society, Statistics for 2006, http://www.cancer.org/ 
docroot/STT/stt_0_2006.asp?sitearea=STT&level=1 (last visited on Sept. 8, 
2007). 
145 N. Y. State Cancer Registry, N. Y. State Dep’t of Health, Table 6: Cancer 
incidence and mortality by age group and region, 2000–2004, New York State 
(2007), available at http://www.health.state.ny.us/statistics/cancer/ 
registry/table6/tb6totalnyc.htm. 
146 Id. 
147 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, TABLE A-27, PERSONS AT WORK IN 
NONAGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES BY AGE, SEX, RACE, HISPANIC OR LATINO 
ETHNICITY, MARITAL STATUS AND USUAL FULL- OR PART-TIME STATUS (2007), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/web/cpseea27.pdf. 
148 BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND MENTAL HYGIENE, SUMMARY OF VITAL STATISTICS, 2005, THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK 13 (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/ 
pdf/vs/2005sum.pdf. 
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not be unexpected, then, to observe increasing cancer occurrence 
and death from cancer in the responder population as they age. 
To distinguish between those cases that one would expect to 
occur regardless of any WTC exposures from those cases that may 
have occurred because of WTC exposures—determining on a 
population basis whether there is an excess risk of developing 
cancer in WTC-affected populations—is scientifically difficult and 
resource intensive. In addition, there are ethical challenges to 
making governmentally-provided medical treatment to WTC 
responders or other affected populations contingent on proving a 
positive association between WTC exposure and chronic health 
effects by means of a multi-year longitudinal study. The 15 to 20 
year time frame for prospective excess morbidity or mortality 
studies raises the ethical issue that even if a causal association is 
found, the findings may only benefit a small number of responders 
who survive the time frame of the study. Like other long term 
excess mortality studies, the real beneficiaries may be future 
responders. 
G.  Funding for the Monitoring and Treatment of Health Effects 
In 2002, Congress provided the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) with $12 million to 
begin a medical screening program for responders and volunteers to 
compliment the FDNY medical screening program which had been 
funded by the American Red Cross. 
In 2003, based on initial reports of a high prevalence of adverse 
respiratory and mental health effects in responders from both 
FDNY and the Mt. Sinai Consortium, Congress appropriated an 
additional $90 million to establish five-year medical monitoring 
programs at FDNY and at the Mt. Sinai Consortium which 
provides for medical evaluation of enrolled responders and 
volunteers every 18 months.149 In addition to providing funds for 
medical monitoring of WTC responders in the 2003 Consolidated 
                                                           
149 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat.  
11, 517–518 (2003), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/ 
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ007.108.pdf. 
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Appropriations Resolution, Congress also provided $1 billion “to 
establish a captive insurance fund . . . for claims arising from debris 
removal, which may include claims made by city employees.”150 
On August 8, 2007, a lawsuit was filed against the WTC Captive 
Insurance Company, the Mayor of New York City, and members 
of the Board of Directors of the WTC Captive Insurance Fund, by 
three WTC responders.151 The plaintiffs allege that the Captive 
Insurance Fund has failed to distribute funds for injured responders 
and that the defendants have converted such funds for their own 
benefit.152 
In 2006, Congress appropriated $75 million to add a treatment 
arm to the monitoring program for those who are sick from WTC-
associated conditions, as well as funding other support functions 
for the Registry and the New York City police officers.153 In 2007, 
Congress provided an additional $50 million for medical treatment 
of responders and volunteers.154 
In the 110th Congress, three bills have been introduced to 
provide funding in the future to monitor and treat the physical and 
mental health effects seen in WTC-affected populations. First, 
Congressman Nadler and 31 co-sponsors introduced on February 
28, 2007 H.R. 1247, the “9/11 Comprehensive Health Benefits Act 
of 2007.”155 H.R. 1247 amends Title XVIII of the Social Security 
                                                           
150 Id. 
151 Walcott v. WTC Captive Ins. Co., Inc., No. 1:2007cv07072 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed Aug. 8, 2007), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/court-
nysdce/case_no-1:2007cv07072//case_id-311197. 
152 Press Release, Marc Jay Bern, Worby Groner & Napoli Bern, LLP, 
Injured Ground Zero Workers Slam WTC Captive Ins. Co. & Mayor 
Bloomberg Over Misuse of FEMA Funds (July 17, 2007), available at 
http://news.findlaw.com/prnewswire/20070718/18jul20072009.html. 
153 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv’s, “HHS 
Completes Allocation of $75 Million for World Trade Center Health Care,” 
(October 27, 2006), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2006pres/ 
20061027.html. 
154 U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112 (2007) 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_ 
cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ028.110.pdf. 
155 9/11 Comprehensive Health Benefits Act of 2007, H.R. 1247, 110th 
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Act to provide “every 9/11 impacted individual” who has a 9/11 
disaster-connected health condition benefits under the federal 
Medicare program.156 H.R. 1247 proposes that medical coverage 
eligibility would be based on “formal diagnosis of a qualified 
medical practitioner or therapist and can reasonably be considered 
in the judgment of such practitioner or therapist to be associated 
with exposure to the 9/11 New York terrorist attacks.” Second, on 
March 22, 2007, Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney and 
Congressman Vito Fossella introduced H.R. 1638, the “James 
Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act.”157 H.R. 1638 
authorizes an extension of funding for the existing medical 
monitoring and treatment programs for responders at FDNY and 
the Mt. Sinai Consortium and for “research on physical and mental 
health conditions that may be related to the September 11th 
terrorist attacks.” Additionally, it establishes a “9/11 Health 
Emergency Coordinating Council”158 and re-opens the September 
11 Victim’s Compensation Fund.”159 
Third, Representatives Maloney, Nadler, and Fossella 
announced on September 7, 2007 that they would introduce a new 
bill called the Maloney-Nadler-Fossella 9/11 Health and 
Compensation Act which would establish the WTC Health 
Program, provide monitoring and treatment for WTC responders in 
the New York City area and outside the area, as well as area 
residents and other non-responders, provide for research into 
conditions, extend support for the NYC Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene, and reopen the September 11, 2001 Victim 
Compensation Fund.160 On September 17, 2007, H.R. 3543 was 
                                                           
Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1247. 
156 Id. 
157 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2007, H.R. 1638, 
110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1638. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Press Release, Reps. Maloney, Nadler & Fossella to Introduce 
Bipartisan 9/11 Health and Compensation Act (Sept. 7, 2007), available at 
http://maloney.house.gov (follow “View All Press Releases” hyperlink at 
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introduced by Representatives Maloney, Nadler, Fossella, and 46 
co-sponsors as a new version of the James Zadroga 9/11 Health 
and Compensation Act of 2007.161 
On the fifth year commemoration of the WTC terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2006, New York City (“NYC”) announced 
funding for WTC health care. NYC Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg 
announced that the city would (1) establish an Environmental 
Health Center at Bellevue Hospital to provide comprehensive 
assessment and treatment services for those not eligible for federal 
funding, (2) fund the Center with $16 million over 5 years, and (3) 
provide the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene $21.6 
million to expand the activities of its WTC Unit.162 
The Mayor also directed NYC Deputy Mayors Linda Gibbs 
and Edward Skyler to co-chair a panel of all NYC agencies that 
serve or represent individuals affected by the WTC-related 
illnesses.163 The Mayor asked for the Panel to develop 
recommendations to ensure those affected by WTC exposures 
would receive appropriate health care and that all municipal 
policies concerning WTC-related health issues would be well-
coordinated.164 The Mayor’s Panel issued its report and 
recommendations to Mayor Bloomberg on February 13, 2007 and 
the Mayor accepted the report and its recommendations in full.165 
                                                           
bottom). 
161 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2007, H.R. 3543, 
110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/ 
D?c110:1:./temp/~c110MfyMvE::. 
162 Press Release, Office of the Mayor, New York City, Mayor Bloomberg 
Announces Comprehensive Citywide Effort to Address 9/11 World Trade Center 
Health-Related Issues (Sept. 5, 2006), available athttp://www.nyc.gov (follow 
“Office of the Mayor” hyperlink, then follow “News and Press Releases” 
hyperlink, then follow “2006 Events” hyperlink, then follow “September 2006” 
hyperlink). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Office of the Mayor, New York City, Mayor Bloomberg Accepts Panel 
Recommendations to Expand Response to Health Impacts of Attacks on the 
World Trade Center (Feb. 13, 2007), available at http://www.nyc.gov (follow 
“Office of the Mayor” hyperlink, then follow “News and Press Releases” 
hyperlink, the follow “February 2007” hyperlink). 
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The report acknowledged that many people continue to suffer 
adverse health effects “that are or may be associated with WTC 
exposure” and made 15 specific recommendations including two 
that were directed at the federal government: (1) the City should 
ensure that federal funding is available for treatment of “9/11-
related physical and mental health needs for all affected and 
potentially affected populations;”166 and (2) Congress should re-
open the September 11th Victim’s Compensation Fund.167 
At the federal level, the President’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 
federal budget allots $25 million for health care for first 
responders.168 The amount proposed in the President’s proposed 
budget is widely acknowledged as a “placeholder” figure and is 
expected to be revised on the recommendation of the Secretary of 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as the FY 2008 
budget is finalized in the Congress.169 
                                                           
166 LINDA GIBBS & EDWARD SKYLER: WORLD TRADE CENTER PANEL, 
ADDRESSING THE HEALTH IMPACTS OF 9–11: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
TO MAYOR MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG 6 (2007), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/911_health_impacts_report.pdf. 
167 Id. 
168 BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2008—
APPENDIX, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUBLIC HEALTH 
AND SOCIAL SERVICES EMERGENCY FUND 435, available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/appendix/hhs.pdf (last visited on 
October 26, 2007). The President’s 2008 Budget for the United States 
Government includes a provision in the Public Health Emergency and Social 
Services Emergency Fund “[F]or expenses to provide screening and treatment 
for first response emergency services personnel related to the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, $25,000,000 shall be 
available until expended.” Id. 
169 Michael Leavitt, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
Secretary, at a meeting of the New York State U.S. Senate and House of 
Representatives (Sept. 7, 2006) (noting that he was forming an HHS WTC 
Task Force to make recommendations about how to provide ongoing health care 
to responders whose health was adversely affected while conducting rescue, 
recovery and clean-up activities at Ground Zero). For additional perspectives on 
the Secretary’s Task Force, see generally 9/11 Health Effects: HHS’s 
Monitoring and Treatment of Responders Before the Subcomm. on Gov.’t 
Mgmt., Organd Procurement, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of John 
Agwunobi, Assistant Secretary for Health), available at 
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III.  COMPENSATION MECHANISMS 
The terrorist attacks in New York City, at the Pentagon in 
Arlington, Virginia, and over the skies of Shanksville, Pennsylvania 
resulted in an unprecedented loss of life, health, property, and 
income for thousands of individuals and business. The attacks also 
generated an equally unprecedented outpouring of effort to provide 
compensation to those who were affected by the attacks. In 2004, 
a study by the RAND Corporation (“RAND”)170 quantified total 
compensation from all sources that was paid to individuals and 
businesses as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.171 Approximately $38.1 billion in expenditures was captured 
in the RAND study.172 This amount can be divided into three 
major categories: (1) $2.7 billion (7 percent) from charity; (2) $15.8 
billion (42 percent) from government; and (3) $19.6 billion (51 
percent) from insurance.173 Another major source of compensation 
following accident events, tort awards, has not (as yet) been a 
                                                           
http://governmentmanagement.oversight.house.gov/documents/2007071111183
2.pdf; Hillary Clinton, Remarks of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton on the 
Progress Since 9/11: Protecting Public Health and Safety of the Responders and 
Residents (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://clinton.senate.gov/ 
news/statements/details.cfm?id=262741; Press Release, Very First Federal 
Dollars for 9/11 Health Treatment to be Distributed by October 1 (Sept. 7, 
2006), available at http://maloney.house.gov (follow “View All Press 
Releases” hyperlink at bottom, then select “Search Press Releases” for “2006”, 
then follow “next” hyperlink ); http://www.hhs.gov/wtc/identify (last visited 
July 27, 2007). 
170 The RAND Corporation traces its origins back to World War II. In 
1948, Project RAND (a contraction of the words “research” and “development”) 
separated from the Douglas Aircraft Company, located in Santa Monica, 
California, and incorporated as an independent, non-profit organization dedicated 
“to furthering and promoting scientific, educational, and charitable purposes for 
the public welfare and the security of the United States.” Rand.org, History and 
Mission, http://www.rand.org/about/history (last visited on Nov. 9, 2007). 
171 LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR 
LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS, at XVIII (2004), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG264/. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
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major source of support for individuals or business.174 
Seven major categories of individuals and business entities 
received varying proportions of the $38.1 billion in total 
compensation.175 Businesses received $23.3 billion (61 percent) 
largely from property damage and business interruption insurance 
policies.176 Civilians killed or seriously injured received $8.7 billion 
(23 percent), chiefly from insurance and government with a small 
portion coming from charitable giving.177 WTC responder-workers 
killed or seriously injured received $1.9 billion (5 percent), chiefly 
from government, but also a small contribution from charity.178 
Non-responder workers received $1.7 billion (4.5 percent) from 
government and charity.179 Lower Manhattan residents received 
$900 million (2.3 percent) from insurance and government with a 
small contribution from charity.180 People suffering environmental 
exposures from debris, smoke and dust—residents and commercial 
building occupants—received a total of $660 million (1.7 percent) 
with the majority coming from government and small amounts from 
insurance and charity.181 Finally, the RAND study accounted for 
$210 million (0.6 percent) received by those who suffered 
emotional injuries.182 
Contributions from charity, government and insurance 
represent the traditional societal mechanisms that are in place to 
provide compensation to those who suffer losses of life, health, 
                                                           
174 Id. The RAND Report states that “[A]s of this writing, no payments 
have been made through the tort system. Some tort cases are being pursued, but 
it will be some time before the tort cases that have been filed are settled.” Id.  
See infra Part III.D. 
175 Id. at xix. 
176 Id. at xix. 
177 LLOYD DIXON & RACHEL KAGANOFF STERN, COMPENSATION FOR 
LOSSES FROM THE 9/11 ATTACKS XVIII (2004), available at http://www.rand. 
org/pubs/monographs/MG264/. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at xxv. 
182 Id. at xxvi. 
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livelihood or business interests from any accidental event.183 How 
effective each of these mechanisms were in accomplishing their 
compensation task—especially for those responders and others 
whose health was not affected immediately after the event, but 
much later in time—is still an open question. 
A.  Charitable Giving 
Both personal and philanthropic charitable giving in response 
to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was significant by 
historical standards. The most important conduit for private 
donations was the American Red Cross (“ARC”). People across 
the United States, and around the world, donated nearly $1.1 
billion to the ARC.184 The ARC used the donated money to 
establish the September 11th Liberty Disaster Relief Fund (the 
“Liberty Fund”).185 
Using Liberty Fund resources, the ARC created the September 
11th Recovery Program to offer recovery services to victims during 
the three to five years following the WTC disaster.186 The Program 
provided $282.2 million in living expenses for rescue workers, 
residents and workers; $209.2 million in family gifts; $186.4 
million for immediate and long term program costs; $167.9 million 
in supplemental gifts; $71.2 million in funding for support 
organizations; $14.7 million for mental health services; $12.2 
million in health care expenses for victims; $11.8 million for special 
circumstances gifts; and only utilized $66.4 million for fund 
stewardship and anniversary travel.187 At the end of December 
2005, the September 11th Recovery Program had $46.5 million in 
donated funds remaining, which the ARC will use to support non-
                                                           
183 LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR LARSON, WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW 
660 (3rd ed. 2000). 
184 ALAN GOODMAN, AMERICAN RED CROSS: SEPTEMBER 11 RECOVERY 
PROGRAM AUGUST 2002–SEPTEMBER 2006 (2006), available at http://www. 
redcross.org/images/pdfs/SRPReport.pdf. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
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profit agencies that can deliver services to WTC-affected groups.188 
To determine how the program performed to meet victims’ 
needs, the ARC commissioned an evaluation by the non-partisan 
Urban Institute. The Urban Institute conducted extensive 
interviews with hundreds of recipients of the Liberty Fund and 
found that the quality of the ARC’s World Trade Center services 
received high marks.189 
As a mechanism of compensation from the WTC attacks, 
charitable giving not only quickly provided services to those most 
in need, it also filled an important gap in the social compensation 
network for the WTC-affected populations. Charity was able to 
provide services to those who were not eligible for government aid 
or who did not have any insurance benefits, such as unauthorized 
immigrant workers and others who did not qualify for government 
aid or underinsured, small business owners.190 
B.  Government Aid 
Government at all levels—federal, state and municipal—sent 
scores of personnel and resources to NYC in response to the 
immediate needs of survivors of the WTC disaster. The Federal 
Emergency Management Administration (“FEMA”), U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, and several other federal, state 
and municipal government agencies, provided hundreds of millions 
of dollars to care for emergency physical and mental health care 
services, environmental assessment, and other support services 
immediately after the towers collapsed.191 An important 
governmental response effort in the area of WTC compensation 
was a unique program called the September 11th Victims 
                                                           
188 Id. 
189 ELAINE MORLEY ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF SERVICES PROVIDED 
UNDER THE AMERICAN RED CROSS SEPTEMBER 11 RECOVERY GRANTS 
PROGRAM (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/publications/411346.html. 
190 Id. 
191 For example, U.S Department of Health and Human Services’ funded 
activities related to the WTC disaster totaled nearly one billion dollars, 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/wtc/doing (last visited on September 8, 2007). 
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Compensation Fund. 
1.  The September 11th Victims Compensation Fund 
In the midst of great concern about the economic viability of 
the airline industry in the United States, Congress drafted, debated 
and passed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization 
Act of 2001 (the “Act”).192 The President signed it into law on 
September 22, 2001.193 The Act accomplished three goals: (1) it 
provided $15 billion in loan guarantees and cash to assist airlines in 
meeting their direct and incremental losses from the terrorist 
attacks; (2) it created an exclusive federal right of action for anyone 
claiming to have been damaged as a result of the terrorist attacks in 
one forum—the Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
New York; and (3) it created the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund (“Fund”).194 
The Fund was established to “provide compensation to any 
individual (or relatives of a deceased individual) that was 
physically injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related 
aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”195 Using a no-fault 
approach to compensation, like that found in state workers’ 
compensation statutes, Congress decided that those injured or 
killed should be compensated without having to prove negligence 
by any party.196 Congress did, however, place several limitations 
on eligibility to the Fund.197 
First, upon submission of either a claim on their own behalf or 
on behalf of another, the regulation required the claimants to waive 
their right to file—or to be a party to—a civil action in federal or 
state court for “damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-
                                                           
192 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-42, § 1-601, 115 Stat. 230 (2003) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101). 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-42, § 403, 115 Stat. 230 (2003) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101). 
196 Id. 
197 Id. 
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related airline crashes of September 11, 2001.”198 The Fund’s 
requirement that a claimant waive his or her right to sue upon 
submission of a claim in exchange for administrative relief under the 
Fund is similar to the compulsory quid pro quo bargain between an 
injured worker (who gives up his right to sue the employer for tort 
damages) and his or her employer (who relieved of the risk of 
having to pay tort damages agrees to provide compensation to the 
injured employee) contained in New York State’s workers’ 
compensation statute and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.199 
Second, an individual had to be physically present at the World 
Trade Center, at the Pentagon, or at the site of the Shanksville, 
Pennsylvania crashes “at the time of, or in the immediate aftermath 
of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”200 
The regulation further defined the term “immediate aftermath” as 
“the period of time from the crashes until 12 hours after the 
crashes” for all claimants other than rescue workers, and “the 
period from the crashes until 96 hours after the crashes” for rescue 
workers who assisted in efforts to search for and recover 
victims.201 
Many ill responders who engaged in rescue, recovery, and 
cleanup work at the site did not arrive at the site until after 96 
hours had elapsed, thereby rendering them ineligible for recovery 
under the Fund. Even some of those ill responders present in the 
                                                           
198 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-42, § 405 (c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. 240 (2001). 
199 N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 204 (1917) (stating that  
[I]t is plain that, on grounds of natural justice, it is not unreasonable for 
the State, while relieving the employer from responsibility from 
damages measured by common law standards and payable in cases 
where he or those for whose conduct he is answerable are found to be at 
fault, to require him to contribute a reasonable amount, and according 
to a reasonable and definite scale, by way of compensation for the loss 
of earning power incurred in the common enterprise, irrespective of the 
question of negligence, instead of leaving the entire loss to rest where it 
may chance to fall—that is, upon the injured employee or his 
dependents). 
200 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-42, § 405 (c)(2)(A)(i), 115 Stat. 239 (2001). 
201 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(b) (2002). 
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first 96 hours did not become ill until after the December 22, 2003 
deadline for submission of claims to the Fund had elapsed.202 The 
immediate aftermath limitation on physical presence for rescue 
workers, although longer in duration than that for non-rescue 
worker claimants, together with the Fund’s short filing deadline, 
has operated to deny Fund eligibility to many ill WTC responders. 
As a result, both early-arriving and later-arriving responders are 
now pursuing fault-based tort litigation actions.203 
Interim final204 and final205 regulations governing administration 
of the Fund provided a gender and race-neutral methodology to 
calculate economic damage awards206 and stipulated a fixed figure 
for non-economic (pain and suffering) damages.207 The collateral 
source rule208 reduced an award from the Fund by the amount 
received from insurance, pension and similar sources.209 However, 
gifts from private charities (even if their original source was the 
government) were not included in a collateral offset.210 
The Fund was shutdown on June 15, 2004.211 At closure, the 
                                                           
202 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-42, § 405 (a)(3), 115 Stat. 239 (2001); 28 C.F.R. § 104.62. 
203 In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 
526–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
204 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001; Interim Final 
Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,273–66,291 (Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. 
pt. 104). 
205 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001; Final Rule, 67 
Fed. Reg. 49, 11,233–11,247 (Mar. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 
104). 
206 See 28 C.F.R. § 104.43 (2007). 
207 Non-economic damage awards were fixed at $250,000, “plus an 
additional $100,000 for the spouse and each dependent of the decedent.” 28 
C.F.R. § 104.44 (2007). 
208 Collateral source rule is “the doctrine that if an injured party receives 
compensation for the injuries from a source independent of the tortfeasor, the 
payment should not be deducted from the damages that the tortfeasor must pay. 
Insurance proceeds are the most common collateral source.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 219 (8th ed. 2004). 
209 28 C.F.R. § 104.41 (2007); 28 C.F.R. pt. 104.47 (2007). 
210 28 C.F.R. § 104.47 (2007). 
211 Closing Statement from the Special Master, Mr. Kenneth R. Feinberg, 
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Fund’s Special Master, Kenneth R. Fineberg, noted “over 7,300 
claims for death or physical injury” were processed and “over 98 
percent of eligible families who had lost a loved one voluntarily 
decided to participate and submitted claims to the Fund” instead of 
pursuing litigation.212 Although Mr. Fineberg characterized the 
Fund as representing “the best in the American character” and 
being “a tribute to the American people,”213 others expressed 
concern about legal and policy issues raised by the Fund.214 
Specifically, concerns were expressed about the use of tax revenues 
to compensate personal injuries that the government did not cause 
and about making receipt of government aid contingent on the 
person relinquishing their right to sue.215 
It is uncertain whether the Fund is the appropriate model for 
handling future personal injury claims arising from terrorist acts 
occurring in the United States. As an administrative no-fault 
alternative to tort, the Fund was viewed as an acceptable 
alternative by Congress and most of its beneficiaries.216 
2.  Efforts to Re-Open September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 
Several factors have prompted continuing discussion about “re-
opening” the Fund. Chief among these factors is an increasing 
awareness of the number of responders who are experiencing later 
onset mental and physical health effects following their WTC 
                                                           
on the Shutdown of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, U.S. 
Department of Justice, September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/victimcompensation/closingstatement.pdf (last 
visited on July 27, 2007). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Joan Bernott Maginnis, The Federalist Soc’y for Law and Pub. Policy 
Studies, The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund: Overview and Comment,  THE 
FEDERALIST SOCIETY,  Mar. 27, 2002, at 2, http://www.fedsoc.org/ 
publications/PubID.136/pub_detail.asp. 
215 Id. 
216 James R. Copland, Tragic Solutions: The 9/11 Victim Compensation 
Fund, Historical Antecedents and Lessons for Tort Reform (Jan. 13, 2005) 
(Center for Legal Policy Working Paper), available at http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/pdf/clpwp_01-13-05.pdf. 
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exposures and who are not eligible to apply for benefits from the 
Fund.217 Nearly three years after closure of the Fund, Congress 
introduced legislation to re-open the Fund.218 H.R. 1638, and its 
successor legislation, H.R. 3543, would amend the Air 
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 to 
allow a claim to be filed by an individual or a personal 
representative on behalf of a deceased individual under two 
exceptions.219 
The first exception permits a claim to be filed during the 5-year 
period after the date of enactment of the amendment if the Special 
Master determines that an individual (1) did not know that he or 
she had suffered physical harm as a result of the terrorist-related 
aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001 until after December 22, 
2003, and before the date of enactment of the Act; (2) did not for 
any reason know that he or she was eligible to file a claim until 
after December 22, 2003; (3) suffered psychological harm as a 
result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes; or (4) who is a 
previous Fund claimant, suffered a significantly greater physical 
harm than was known to the individual as of the date the claim was 
filed, and did not know the full extent of the physical harm suffered 
as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes until after the date 
on which the claim was filed and before the date of enactment.220 
The second exception permits a claim to be filed during the five 
year period after the date that the individual: (1) first knew that he 
                                                           
217 Many responders did not become aware that the ill-health they were 
experiencing was related to their WTC exposures until after the period of filing 
under the Fund had closed. See LINDA GIBBS & EDWARD SKYLER, WORLD 
TRADE CTR. HEALTH PANEL, ADDRESSING THE HEALTH IMPACTS OF 9–11 (Feb. 
13, 2007), available at http://home.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/911_health_impacts_ 
report.pdf. 
218 Two bills have been introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives 
that address the same issue of re-opening the Fund. See H.R. 1638, 110th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill 
=h110-1638; H.R. 3543, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?c110:1:./temp/ ~c110MfyMvE::. 
219 James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2007, H.R. 3543, 
110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c110:1:./temp/~c110gT2hvd::. 
220 Id. 
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or she had suffered physical or psychological harm, so long as the 
Special Master determines that the individual did not know of such 
harm until a date that is on or after the date of enactment, or (2) in 
the case of an individual who had previously filed a claim and who 
had suffered a significantly greater physical harm than was known 
to the individual when the claim was filed, or had suffered 
psychological harm, first knew of the full extent of the physical 
and psychological harm suffered, so long as the Special Master 
determines that the individual did not know the full extent of the 
harm until a date that is on or after the date of enactment.221 
Proposed Title III of H.R. 1638 would also amend Section 
405(c)(2)(A)(i) of the Act to give the Special Master the power to 
define the term “immediate aftermath.”222 The starting point for a 
redefined “immediate aftermath” would be “any period of time 
after the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001” to 
that time the Special Master determines “was sufficiently close in 
time to the crashes that there was a demonstrable risk to the 
claimant of physical or psychological harm resulting from the 
crashes, including the period of time during which rescue, recovery, 
and cleanup activities relating to the crashes were conducted.”223 A 
redefined “immediate aftermath,” so long as such a period of time 
included the span of time during which all WTC recovery and 
cleanup activities were completed, would make eligible the entire 
estimated responder population of nearly 92,000 individuals.224 
C.  Insurance Payments 
Insurance payments were a third mechanism of compensating 
businesses and individuals for losses arising from the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. However, insurance payments were 
not equally distributed; more than 85 percent of insurance 
payments went to business enterprises under various policies such 
as property casualty, business interruption, and event 
                                                           
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
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cancellation,225 leaving small businesses poorly compensated.226 
Prior to September 11, 2001, businesses did not carry insurance 
against terrorism-related losses, whereas many businesses now 
carry such insurance through the federally sponsored Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Program (“TRIA”).227 Individual insurance 
beneficiaries received the remaining 15 percent of insurance 
payments under individual life insurance policies, individual and 
employer-based disability policies, and under employer-financed 
workers’ compensation policies and pension plans.228 
Insurance payments under workers’ compensation policies 
have not been problematic for those workers who were killed or 
injured as a result of the aircraft crashes on September 11, 2001. 
However, for rescue, recovery, or cleanup workers who responded 
as a job duty or as a volunteer, “state workers’ compensation 
systems, designed to handle workplace injuries like broken arms, 
are not well suited for determining an illness that may take months 
or years to develop.”229 
The issue may be both legal and perceptual. First, there are a 
number of specific characteristics of New York State’s workers’ 
compensation laws that act as obstacles for WTC responder-
                                                           
225 DIXON & STERN, supra note 171, at xx. 
226 DIXON & STERN, supra note 171, at xxix. 
227 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 
2322 (2002). On November 26, 2002, President Bush signed into law the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”) to ensure that the U.S. economy could 
recover from financial devastation caused by future terrorist attacks and which 
was set to expire in December 31, 2005. On December 22, 2005, President 
Bush signed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-
144, 119 Stat. 2660 (2005), which extended the Program through December 31, 
2007. TRIA requires the federal government to pay a share of compensation for 
insured losses in accordance with Section 103(e) of the Act. The Extension Act 
provided that no federal share would be paid unless the aggregate industry 
insured losses from a certified act of terrorism after March 31, 2006 exceeded a 
certain amount. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Program; TRIA Extension Act 
Implementation, 71 Fed. Reg. 165, 50341-50347 (Aug. 25, 2006). 
228 Id. 
229 Anthony DePalma, Officials Slow to Hear Claims of 9/11 Illnesses, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/05/ 
nyregion/05health.html. 
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claimants who are employees of NYC. Second, there is a view that 
NYC, as a self-insured employer, tends to controvert claims from 
its responder-employees to be consistent with its litigation 
position in a tort suit for damages arising from WTC exposures 
brought by some of those same responder-employees.230 
Regardless of the legal and perceptual issues, it should not 
come as a surprise that a compensation system crafted in the late 
19th century in response to accidents of the early-to-mid Industrial 
Revolution, and based squarely on the actuarial risk of foreseeable 
industrial injuries, would have trouble responding to an 
unprecedented workplace risk arising from terrorist attacks by 
means of hijacked jet aircraft. 
1.  Workers’ Compensation Insurance 
In New York, the industrial accident crisis of the middle to late 
19th century led to a number of responses: judges created a common 
law of torts to deal with the onslaught of industrial accidents; 
manufacturing workers chartered cooperative insurance societies to 
protect themselves and their families from the ruin occasioned by 
an industrial accident; and employers developed private 
compensation plans.231 Ultimately, these efforts were not 
successful, and advocates for a no-fault administrative 
compensation system finally succeeded in New York State in 1910 
when the legislature enacted compulsory accident-compensation 
laws.232 The new law had an inauspicious start as the state’s 
highest court struck it down eight months after its enactment as an 
unconstitutional taking of employers’ property.233 A constitutional 
                                                           
230 Op-Ed., $400M For Lawyers? The Sick and Dying of 9–11 Deserve 
Better, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 3, 2006, available at http://www. 
nydailynews.com/news/2006/09/03/2006-09-03_400m_for_lawyers_the_sick_ 
and_dying_of_9.html. 
231 JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED 
WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 
(Harvard University Press) (2004). 
232 Workmen’s Compensation Law, Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 674, 1910 
N.Y. Laws 1945. 
233 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). 
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amendment nullified the decision and made New York a pioneer in 
providing social insurance for workplace accidents.234 
The introduction of a workers’ compensation statute in New 
York State “represented a striking new introduction of actuarial 
categories and probabilistic principles into American law.”235 This 
point is important when considering the performance of a workers’ 
compensation statute in an event as highly improbable or 
actuarially remote as the WTC disaster. The early 20th century 
design parameters for a workers’ compensation scheme did not 
envision an event so thoroughly unforeseeable as the WTC 
disaster. 
Immediately after the WTC disaster, Congress provided the 
New York State Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) $175 
million for various purposes including $125 million for 
administrative expenses, $25 million for the Uninsured Employers’ 
Fund and $25 million for volunteers for reimbursement of claims 
related to “the first response emergency services personnel who 
were injured, were disabled, or died due to the terrorist attacks.”236 
A concern soon after the WTC disaster was that many 
employers would be unable to cover the workers’ compensation 
losses occasioned by the attacks.237 That assessment turned out to 
be wrong; all employers with offices in the WTC towers with 
injured, disabled, or deceased workers as a result of the WTC 
disaster were able to cover their losses through existing policies.238 
A group that did lack insured employers was the WTC volunteers 
who had served as “first responder emergency services 
personnel.”239 Congress had not provided eligibility criteria to the 
Board for disbursement of the funds for emergency services 
                                                           
234 Witt, supra note 231, at 175. 
235 Witt, supra note 231, at 175. 
236 Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for 
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, Ch. 115 Stat. 2230, 2312–13 (Jan. 10, 2002). 
237 Interview with Richard Bell, former Acting Executive Director, New 
York State Workers’ Compensation Board, in Albany, N.Y.  (May 12, 2006) 
[hereinafter Interview with Richard Bell]. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. 
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personnel and the New York Legislature also failed to enact 
eligibility criteria for volunteers which would allow their claims to 
be paid by the Uninsured Employers’ Fund (the “UEF”).240 
Acting on its own, the Board provided their criteria for 
accepting and adjudicating claims under the UEF, which included: 
(1) serving without compensation or remuneration; and (2) serving 
under the direction of an authorized rescue entity or volunteer 
agency providing services such as firefighting, rescue, emergency 
medical, health and sanitation services, emergency debris clearance, 
care and shelter of those made homeless, distribution of food, water 
and medical supplies, and other equipment.241 The second prong of 
the eligibility criteria—the proof of presence requirement—proved 
difficult for “spontaneous” or unaffiliated volunteers, i.e., 
volunteers not affiliated with an authorized rescue or volunteer 
agency.242 
Employers who directed their employees to respond to the 
WTC disaster are required under existing NYS Workers’ 
Compensation laws to provide compensation to those employees 
who were injured as a result of those activities.243 Generally, injury 
by accident is unexpected and occurs at a definite time, but if both 
factors are absent, “one sees the typical occupational disease.”244 
Occupational Disease. All states provide general compensation 
coverage for occupational diseases usually by codifying a limited 
list of diseases followed by a “catch-all” provision.245 New York 
State defines an occupational disease as a “disease resulting from 
the nature of employment and contracted therein”246 and provides a 
list of 29 specific diseases with a catch-all provision.247 To be 
entitled to workers’ compensation benefits based on an 
occupational disease theory, the disease must be caused by the 
                                                           
240 Id. 
241 Robert R. Snashall, Chair, New York State Workers’ Compensation 
Board, Revised Order of the Chair, #967 (July 22, 2003). 
242 Id. 
243 N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2007). 
244 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 183, at 202. 
245 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 183, at 202. 
246 N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 2(15) (McKinney 2007). 
247 Id. at § 3(2). 
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actual nature of the employment with reference to the processes by 
which they are acquired.248 If the alleged disease is caused by a 
condition in the environment of the workplace, it is not generally 
compensable under New York law.249 Under the “nature of 
employment” requirement for occupational disease claims,250 WTC 
responders had no recourse other than to file under personal injury 
by accident. 
Personal Injury by Accident. Most cases of death or severe 
injury arising from the trauma of the WTC collapse demonstrated a 
prima facie case for personal injury by accident. However, when 
the condition develops over time—as opposed to suddenly—
claims are more problematic under an injury by accident theory. 
The New York Legislature has limited the definition of 
“occupational disease” to diseases assignable to the specific nature 
of employment.251 In some cases, an occupational disease has been 
filed as an accident and has been judicially determined252 to meet 
the necessary standard as arising from “unusual environmental 
conditions or events assignable to something extraordinary . . . .”253 
In addition to a requirement to give the employer notice of the 
injury or illness and to report any injury to the employer within 
thirty days of the accident, there is a two year statute of 
limitations on filing workers’ compensation claims.254 Many 
                                                           
248 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 183, at 229. 
249 Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 82 N.E.2d 785, 786 (N.Y. 1948)  
(“An ailment does not become an occupational disease simply because it is 
contracted on the employer’s premises. It must be one which is commonly 
regarded as natural to, inhering in, an incident and concomitant of, the work in 
question. There must be a recognizable link between the disease and some 
distinctive feature of the claimant’s job, common to all jobs of that sort.”). 
250 ROBERT R. SNASHALL, CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK STATE WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION BOARD, A STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN THE 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEM 13, available at http://www.wcb.state.ny. 
us/content/main/TheBoard/odstudy.pdf (last visited on May 1, 2007). 
251 N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 2(15) (McKinney 2007). 
252 Johannesen v. N.Y. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 84 N.Y.2d 129, 138–
39 (N.Y. 1994); Engler v. United Parcel Service, 16 A.D.3d 969, 970 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005). 
253 Johannesen, 84 N.Y.2d at 138. 
254 See N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 2(28) (McKinney 2007)  
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responders did not become aware that the adverse health conditions 
they were experiencing could be related to their work at the WTC 
site until after the statutory time periods for filing workers’ 
compensation claims had elapsed.255 As a result, responders filing 
workers’ compensation claims beyond September 11, 2003 were 
barred by operation of law. 
By 2006, the “controversion”256 of many responder claims led 
to a public outcry to extend the two-year statute of limitations.257 
The NYS Legislature extended the two-year filing deadline to allow 
claims for later-occurring conditions alleged to be causally related to 
exposures while participating in rescue, recovery, and clean up 
activities at the WTC to be recognized as occupational diseases and 
for claim filing and notice provisions to begin to run from the date 
of disablement rather than the date of exposure.258 
The NYS Legislature did not enact an unlimited extension of 
time to file a claim for workers’ compensation benefits related to 
disease arising from WTC exposures. Instead the legislation made 
the ability to file a claim in the future for later-occurring health 
                                                           
[T]he right to claim compensation under this chapter shall be 
barred . . . unless within two years after the accident, or if death results 
therefrom within two years after such death, a claim for compensation 
shall be filed with the chairman, but the employer and insurance carrier 
shall be deemed to have waived the bar of the statute unless the 
objection to the failure to file the claim within two years is raised on 
the first hearing on such claim at which all parties in interest are 
present. 
255 Interview with Robert Snashall, former Executive Dir., N.Y. State 
Workers’ Comp. Bd., in New York, N.Y.  (Feb. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Interview 
with Robert Snashall]. 
256 Controversion means challenging the legal validity of a claim. See Your 
Business and Worker’s Compensation, What to Do When An Accident 
Happens, available at http://www.wcb.state.ny.us/content/main/Small_ 
Business/claimsprocess2.jsp (last visited on Nov. 9, 2007) (“The insurance 
carrier can contest the claim for a variety of reasons, including that the injury 
was not related to work, or the employee is not injured to the extent that he or 
she is claiming.”). 
257 Interview with Robert Snashall, supra note 255. 
258 Act of Aug. 14, 2006, ch. 446, 2006 N.Y. Laws (adding a new article 8-
A to the Workers’ Comp. Laws of N.Y. State). 
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effects contingent on “registering” with the Board before August 
14, 2007:259 
“[T]o register, those employees and volunteers who 
participated in the World Trade Center rescue, recovery 
and cleanup operations . . . must file with the Workers’ 
Compensation Board . . . a sworn statement, on Form 
WTC-12, listing the dates and locations of their 
participation in the rescue, recovery and cleanup 
efforts.”260 
Filing the registration form does not constitute filing a claim, but it 
will give the Board some basis on which to predict future costs. 
Recently, the NYS Legislature extended the deadline for 
“registering” to August 14, 2008.261 
In 2006, Congress rescinded $125 million of the Board’s 
original 2002 appropriation,262 but then reappropriated $50 million 
to the Board to pay Uninsured Employers’ Fund263 (“UEF”) 
claims filed by “first response emergency services personnel.”264 In 
                                                           
259 Id. at § 162. 
260 Donna Ferrara, Extension of Filing Time in World Trade Center 
Rescue, Recovery and Cleanup Cases (Aug. 21, 2006), available at 
http://www.wcb.state.ny.us/content/main/SubjectNos/sn046_159.htm. 
261 Press Release, N.Y. State Workers’ Compensation Board, Deadline 
Extended for World Trade Center Responders and Volunteers to Register for 
Workers’ Compensation Benefits (July 10, 2007), available at http://www.wcb. 
state.ny.us/content/main/PressRe/2007/DeadlineExtforWTCResponders.jsp. 
262 Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services and Education and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 109-149, 119 Stat. 2833, 
2834 (2006). 
263 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 183, at 572  
The most satisfactory solution to the uninsured employer problem is to 
provide an uninsured employer fund, as is done in a substantial and 
steadily growing number of states. The fund pays compensation to the 
employee of the uninsured employer, then turns upon the employer and 
calls it to account, armed with a battery of penalties, sometimes 
including fines and imprisonment, which cannot fail to impress the 
most elusive and irresponsible of employers. 
264 Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to 
Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexicoand Pandemic Influenza Act, Pub. L. 
No. 109–148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2814 (2006). 
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light of the new legislation adding Article 8-A to the Workers 
Compensation Law, the Board determined that if such a claim by a 
WTC responder was challenged by the employer or the carrier, the 
UEF would be responsible for payment of medical benefits 
pending final adjudication of whether the individual was an 
employee or a volunteer.265 If a final determination finds that the 
individual was an employee, then the employer would be required 
to reimburse the UEF.266 The Board made it clear that its Order 
was not to be construed as extending the liability and/or 
responsibility of the UEF beyond the available funds appropriated 
by Congress in 2006.267 It is most likely that medical payments 
will be paid only until the federal monies are exhausted; it is 
uncertain what funding mechanism would continue to pay medical 
benefits for those successful UEF claimants who need care. 268 
It is important to note that meeting a registration deadline is 
only one hurdle to WTC claimants. For those who register before 
the August 2008 deadline and subsequently develop an illness and 
make a claim based on their registration eligibility, medical evidence 
that their claimed conditions arose from their WTC work will still 
be required—no disease causation presumption has been built into 
the workers’ compensation laws of NYS as of yet.269 
                                                           
265 DONNA FERRARA, NEW YORK STATE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
BOARD, EXTENSION OF FILING TIME IN WORLD TRADE CENTER RESCUE, 
RECOVERY AND CLEAN UP CASES (2006). 
266 Interview with Cheryl M. Wood, former Chief Counsel, State of New 
York Workers’ Compensation Board, in Albany, N.Y. (May 12, 2006). 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. 
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D.  Tort Awards 
By 2003, Congress was concerned enough with the possibility 
of tort suits brought by responders for damages to health to 
provide “up to $1 billion to establish a captive insurance company 
or other appropriate insurance mechanism for claims arising from 
debris removal, which may include claims made by city 
employees.”270 Congress also imposed liability protections for the 
airline industry and created a government financed September 11th 
Victim Compensation Fund.271 
Most survivors of those killed in the attacks and those who 
were acutely injured opted to receive compensation through the 
Fund rather than file a tort claim.272 Responders and residents, 
however, have filed at least three notable tort suits against 
government and private sector entities for longer-term damages to 
their health arising from the WTC disaster response.273 
1.  In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation274 
Rescue, recovery and cleanup workers who experienced adverse 
physical and mental health effects were largely excluded from 
seeking compensation from the Fund because of the short filing 
                                                           
270 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 
11, 517–18 (2003). 
271 Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1265, 1287–88 (2003). 
272 Ninety-eight percent of those who lost a loved one filed with the Fund 
and the Fund received 4,400 personal injury claims for which they issued 2,682 
awards. Awards ranged from a low of $500 to a high of over $8.6 million after 
offsets. Compensation for Personal Injury Victims, Award Payment Statistics, 
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ 
victimcompensation/payments_injury.html (last visited on September 8, 2007). 
273 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 526–
30 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Benzman v. Whitman, No. 04 Civ. 1888(DAB), 2006 
WL 3771014 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006); Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73 
(2d Cir. 2007). 
274 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
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deadline compared to the onset of ill effects after their WTC 
exposures. This was so because the filing deadline occurred prior to 
responders making a connection between adverse health effects 
they experienced and their activities at the WTC.275 
Nearly 10,000 of these WTC responders, volunteers, and their 
survivors, filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York (or their claims were consolidated 
there) for damages to their life and health.276 Plaintiffs sued a 
number of different defendants, including: (1) the City of New 
York (which coordinated all the work of the WTC site through the 
City’s Department of Design and Construction); (2) the Port 
Authority of the States of New York and New Jersey (the owner 
of the WTC site); (3) four of the city’s major contractors (Bovis 
Lend Lease, AMEC Construction Management, Tully 
Construction Company, and Turner Construction Company) and 
their many subcontractors who undertook the recovery work; and 
(4) various entities with a property interest in buildings at, and 
around, the WTC site, including Verizon Communications, 
Consolidated Edison (“Con Ed”), the Silverstein Entities and the 
Westfield Entities.277 
Plaintiffs claimed that NYC, its contractors, and other 
defendants were negligent in monitoring the air and assuring proper 
safety at Ground Zero, especially in failing to provide appropriate 
respiratory protection equipment and ensuring its proper use.278 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims based on 
both state and federal laws providing immunity for actions taken in 
response to the WTC disaster, including the New York State 
Defense Emergency Act,279 the New York Disaster Act,280 the 
                                                           
275 See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
276 The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. 
No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001), provides in § 408(b)(3) that “The 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York shall have 
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim 
(including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) resulting 
from or relating to the terrorist-related crashes of September 11, 2001.” 
277 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 525–26. 
278 Id. at 523. 
279 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW SDEA § 9102-a (McKinney 2006). 
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Stafford Act,281 and common law and derivative federal 
immunities.282 
On October 17, 2006, the court issued an Order both denying 
in part and granting in part the defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.283 The court carefully considered all state and federal 
laws that the governmental and non-governmental defendants 
claimed granted them immunity from liability, including the 
plaintiffs’ claim that the legislative purpose behind the Air 
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 was 
to preempt state and federal law providing immunity to NYC, its 
contractors, and other defendants.284 The court considered the basis 
of immunity separately.285 
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act. The 
court declined to extend federal preemption under the Air 
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 “to 
preclude application of otherwise available state law immunity 
defenses” and declined to bar federal immunity doctrines “as 
contradictory to the alleged compensatory purpose of the Act.”286 
New York State Defense Emergency Act. In the case of the 
immunity available under the New York State Defense Emergency 
Act, the court found that determining “whether the emergency 
lasted for days, or weeks, or months, and in connection with which 
precise activities, are fact-intensive questions, not possible to 
answer in connection with a Rule 12 motion addressed to the 
pleadings.”287 
New York Disaster Act. The court declined to grant immunity 
to the City under the New York Disaster Act because “the 
Disaster’s Act’s grant of immunity is limited to actions that are 
emergent in their own quality, and not only because those actions 
                                                           
280 N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 20-19-g (McKinney 2006). 
281 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006). 
282 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 547–62. 
283 See Id. 
284 Id. at 543–46. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 546. 
287 Id. at 554. 
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were intended to alleviate a previous emergency condition[.]”288 
The court also refused to grant immunity altogether to private 
contractors because the Disaster Act “expressly limits its grant of 
immunity to actions taken by political subdivisions and their 
employees and officers.”289 
New York State Common Law Immunity. The court considered 
the governmental defendants’ (and Con Edison’s) claim that 
performance of uniquely governmental functions after the WTC 
attacks provided them with sovereign immunity but decided that 
“[t]he issue cannot be decided in the context of a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings. It requires a proper, and fully 
developed, factual record.”290 
Derivative Federal Immunity. Defendants argued that the active 
participation of federal agencies in developing protocols for health 
and safety at the WTC site is enough to provide them with 
derivative federal immunity.291 The court agreed that if the 
defendants acted according to specific instructions from a federal 
agency and under the control and direction of the federal agency, 
derivative immunity may be available; however, it would not exist 
where the defendants “act[ed] independently, or outside of, or in 
addition to, the government’s specifications.”292 The court found, 
though, that the record presented did not allow it “to demark the 
boundary between federally instructed discretionary decisions, and 
those made by the various Defendants” and denied the motion for 
summary judgment based on derivative federal immunity.293 
Stafford Act Immunity. Various defendants asserted immunity 
pursuant to the Stafford Act,294 but the court declined to extend 
immunity under the Act to non-federal parties because “to do so 
would extend the Act beyond its plain terms.”295 In reminding the 
                                                           
288 See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 
558 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 559. 
291 Id. at 560. 
292 Id. at 566. 
293 Id. 
294 42 U.S.C. § 5148 (2006). 
295 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 558 
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parties that immunity is to be interpreted narrowly, the court 
commented on the defendants’ argument that private parties should 
be encouraged by courts to enlist in recovery efforts from mass 
disasters.296 The court stated that “the same policy has to be 
sensitive to the individual workers who risk their lives.”297 The 
court also explained that “the job of restoring society cannot be 
based on a system rewarding businesses, but being indifferent to 
the health and welfare of working people.”298 
Other Bases for Federal Immunity. The Port Authority and 
WTC Lessee defendants (Con Edison and Silverstein) argued that 
“the federal government’s promise to pay . . . all the costs 
associated with rescue and recovery . . . makes the federal 
government the real party in interest” and therefore, plaintiffs’ 
actions against them should be dismissed.299 The court noted that 
indemnification may be sought by the defendants from the federal 
government, but that “such promise of payment, however, does 
not operate to suspend ordinary rules of rights and obligations 
running between a tortfeasor and his alleged victim.”300 
The court did, however, grant Con Edison’s and WTC 
defendants’ motions based on the fact that they “were immediately 
divested of control over their leasehold interests and were entirely 
denied access to their properties absent express authorization by 
the City and Port Authority.”301 The court denied the motions to 
dismiss made by the Port Authority, NYC, and its contractors, 
concluding that “the state and federal statutes that provide 
immunity protect the remaining defendants against suit, but the 
precise scope and extent of the immunity varies according to date, 
place and activity [and] . . . the fact-intensive nature of the issue 
                                                           
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
296 Id. at 41. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. (noting Defendants’ reliance on Proclamation 7463—Declaration of 
National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Acts, September 14, 2001. 
66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (September 18, 2001)). 
300 Id. 
301 Id. at 96. 
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makes its resolution unsuitable for resolution by motion.”302 
2.  Benzman v. Whitman303 
In 2004, a lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York by representatives of a class 
composed of (1) residents of Lower Manhattan (including 
Chinatown and the Lower East Side) and Brooklyn; (2) students 
attending schools in Lower Manhattan or Brooklyn; and (3) 
workers from places of employment in Lower Manhattan and 
Brooklyn, who were exposed to hazardous substances in the 
interior of their residences, schools, and workplaces as a result of 
the dust released from the WTC collapse.304 The lawsuit named the 
former and current Administrators of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), as well as the former 
Assistant EPA Administrator, as defendants.305 
Plaintiffs alleged four counts against the defendants.306 In 
Count One, the plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation against 
individual defendants, Christine Todd Whitman, the former EPA 
Administrator and Marianne Horinko, the former Assistant 
Administrator.307 Under Count One, the plaintiffs sought 
compensatory damages, reimbursement of costs, and the creation 
of a fund to finance a medical monitoring.308 
In Count Two, plaintiffs alleged that the EPA violated the 
Administrative Procedures Act—specifically six regulatory 
                                                           
302 Id. 
303 First Amended Class Action Complaint, Benzman v. Whitman, No. 
04-Civ. 1888, 2006 WL 250527 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006). 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. See also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring: The Right 
Way and the Wrong Way, 70 MO. L. REV. 349, 361–62 (2005) (noting that the 
U.S. Supreme Court and a number of state supreme courts have refused to 
recognize medical monitoring as a cause of action absent present physical injury, 
while 11 states plus the District of Columbia allow medical monitoring claim to 
be made without a showing of present physical injury). 
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provisions contained in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan (“NCP”).309 Count Three alleged a 
mandamus claim against EPA related to Count Two, and Count 
Four alleged a citizen suit claim against the EPA under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”).310 
Individual defendants moved to dismiss Count One for 
plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.311 The EPA moved to dismiss Counts Two, Three, and 
Four for plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted and the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter.312 
Count One. The U.S. Constitution does not expressly provide 
for a right of redress for a violation by a federal officer acting under 
color of authority which deprives an individual of a constitutional 
right.313 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, the 
Supreme Court created a substantive due process right for damages 
against federal officers for violating an individual’s constitutional 
rights.314 In Rochin v. California, the Supreme Court found that 
substantive due process encompasses an individual’s right to 
bodily integrity free from unjustifiable governmental 
interference.315 
Even though the Supreme Court has recognized a substantive 
due process right to bodily integrity, the Court made clear in 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services that “as a 
general matter . . . a state’s failure to protect an individual against 
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due 
                                                           
309 First Amended Class Action Complaint, Benzman v. Whitman, No. 
04-Civ. 1888, 2006 WL 250527, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006). 
310 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1986). The citizen suit provision of CERCLA 
permits citizens to sue on their own behalf when, after giving notice, the 
government has failed to take actions to correct certain environmental harms. 
311 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
312 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). 
313 See Benzman, 2006 WL 250527, at *12. 
314 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
315 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
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Process Clause.”316 DeShaney provided two exceptions, 
however.317 The first exception occurs when a “special 
relationship” exists between the state and the individual who claims 
protection such as when the state has custody of a prisoner.318 The 
second exception—the “state-created danger” exception—exists 
when a state official takes an affirmative role either in creating the 
danger or in making the plaintiff more vulnerable to the danger.319 
However, actions of the state officials under the “state-created 
danger” exception must “shock the conscience.”320 
The constitutional right that the Benzman plaintiffs asserted 
had been violated was their “substantive due process rights to 
bodily integrity, and more specifically their right to be free of 
official government policies that increase the risk of bodily 
harm[.]”321 Plaintiffs’ claimed that defendants violated those 
constitutional rights when the defendants released statements in the 
days after the WTC attacks.322 
The defendants argued: (1) no substantive due process right 
existed based on the facts of the case; (2) the “state-created danger” 
doctrine was clearly misapplied by the plaintiffs; (3) the asserted 
constitutional right was so infirm that it’s existence did not 
preclude a qualified immunity defense; and (4) even if a 
constitutional right was found to be clearly established, the actions 
of the EPA officials did not “shock the conscience.”323 Based on 
these arguments, the defendants motioned the court for a dismissal 
of the case.324 
Relying on a number of Circuit Courts’ opinions, the court 
found that the state-created danger doctrine was applicable “where 
                                                           
316 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). 
317 Id. at 199. 
318 Id. at 199–200. 
319 Id. at 201. See also Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 
1993). 
320 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998). 
321 Benzman v. Whitman, No.04-Civ.1888, 2006 WL 250527, at *14 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006). 
322 Id. at *6, 17. 
323 Id. at *14. 
324 Id. 
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the government affirmatively acts to increase the threat to an 
individual of third-party private harm,”325 so long as a plaintiff can 
provide evidence that “a state officer’s conduct places a person in 
peril in deliberate indifference to their safety,”326 and a person is 
harmed by police officers agreeing to “stand by” rather than 
protect a citizen from harm by third parties.327 
In deciding on the dismissal motion and considering the facts in 
a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the court then examined 
whether the defendants had merely failed to act or whether they 
had in some way assisted “in creating or increasing the danger” to 
the plaintiffs by affirmative acts.328 The court found no shortage of 
affirmative acts by defendant Whitman: (1) making affirmative 
statements that the EPA would clean up building interiors to an 
acceptable level of safety, but failed to do so, and allowing 
residents, office workers, firefighters and school children to return 
to contaminated buildings on September 17, 2001; (2) knowingly 
disseminating false statements to victims of the attacks regarding 
the air quality; (3) delegating the task of cleaning indoor residences, 
schools, and commercial office buildings to entities other than the 
federal government; (4) endorsing and disseminating NYC’s grossly 
improper cleaning instructions; and (5) failing generally to ensure a 
clean-up of the WTC impact area and decontamination of buildings 
containing cancer-causing agents and other hazardous substances.329 
The court concluded that like the police officers in Dwares v. 
City of New York, Whitman had taken affirmative acts that 
increased the danger to the plaintiffs from the WTC disaster. The 
court was emphatic about the defendants’ actions that it found 
particularly actionable.330 
It is at this point, when the harmful emissions created a 
                                                           
325 Coyne v. Cronin, 386 F.3d 280, 287 (1st Cir. 2004). 
326 Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1997). 
327 Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993). 
328 Benzman, 2006 WL 250527, at *15 (quoting Dwares, 985 F.2d at 94). 
329 Id. at *19 (finding that the actions alleged were not attributable to 
defendant former EPA Assistant Administrator Horinko individually, the Court 
dismissed Count One against her). 
330 Id. at *20. 
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danger to the public that Whitman, knowing the likely harm 
to those exposed to the hazardous materials, encouraged 
residents, workers and students to return to the area. By 
these actions, she increased, and may have in fact created, 
the danger to Plaintiffs, namely harm to their persons 
through exposure to the hazardous substances in the air 
after the WTC collapse. Without doubt, if Plaintiffs had not 
been told by the head of a federal agency entrusted with 
monitoring the environment that it was safe, plaintiffs 
would not have so readily returned to the area so soon after 
the attacks.331 
The court then turned to Whitman’s defense of qualified 
immunity but found that the defense was not available to the 
defendants because “[n]o reasonable person would have thought 
that telling thousands of people that it was safe to return to Lower 
Manhattan, while knowing that such return could pose long-term 
health risks and other dire consequences, was conduct sanctioned 
by our laws.”332 To this end, the court decided that “Defendant 
Whitman is not entitled to the defense of qualified immunity” on a 
motion to dismiss.333 Defendant Whitman has filed an interlocutory 
appeal of this decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and 
the appeal is pending.334 
Counts Two, Three and Four. The court retained Count Two 
but dismissed Counts Three and Four against the EPA. The EPA 
has appealed to the Second Circuit and the Appeal is pending.335 
3.  Attempt to Intervene in Benzman v. Whitman 
In February of 2006, a group of WTC recovery and cleanup 
workers—part of the group of thousands of plaintiffs of In re 
                                                           
331 Id. at *19 (emphasis in original). 
332 Id. 
333 Id. at *20. 
334 Benzman v. Whitman, No. 04-Civ.1888, 2006 WL 250527, at *20 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006) (Defs.’ Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, March 8, 
2006). 
335 Id. (Defs.’ Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal and to Stay 
Proceedings and Incorporated Mem. of Law, March 9, 2006). 
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World Trade Center Site Litigation—filed a motion to intervene in 
the EPA litigation.336 
On October 20, 2006, their motion to intervene was denied by 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York337 on 
the grounds that, to the extent the putative intervenors have an 
interest in this case, that interest is adequately protected by the 
plaintiffs.338 
Subsequently, in a motion for reconsideration, petitioners 
asserted that the court was incorrect in its previous order when it 
dismissed their claims for medical monitoring. Petitioners added 
new arguments challenging the adequacy of the plaintiffs’ 
protection of their interests.339 In a December 15, 2006 
memorandum and order, the court found unpersuasive the putative 
intervenors’ new reasons for why they should intervene and thus 
denied their motion to reconsider.340 Putative intervenors filed an 
appeal to the U.S. Appeals Court for the Second Circuit but 
voluntarily withdrew their appeal without prejudice.341 
4.  Lombardi v. Whitman342 
A third law suit was filed by five WTC responders who 
performed search, rescue, and cleanup work against a group of 
federal government officials, including a former EPA Administrator 
and a former Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Occupational 
                                                           
336 Id. (Mem. of Law in Support of Claimants’ Mot. To Intervene, Feb. 21, 
2006). 
337 Id. (Order, Oct. 20, 2006). 
338 Id. 
339 Mot. for Reconsideration, Benzman v. Whitman, 2006 WL 3879748 
(Nov. 6, 2006). 
340 Benzman v. Whitman, No. 04-Civ. 1888, 2006 WL 3771014 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006) (memorandum and order denying motion to 
reconsider the court’s October 20, 2006 order denying leave to intervene). 
341 Notice of Appeal from October 20, 2006 Order, Benzman v. Whitman, 
No. 04 Civ. 1888, 2006 WL 3771014 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006). 
342 Lombardi v. Whitman, No.-04-CV-9272, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4464 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2006) aff’d, 485 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).343 In Lombardi v. 
Whitman, the plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs in Benzman, sought a 
Bivens constitutional tort remedy.344 They alleged the defendants 
knowingly made false reassurances that the air in NYC after the 
WTC disaster was safe to breathe, that such reassurances were the 
proximate cause of their injury, and that that the defendants’ 
conduct violated their right to substantive due process.345 
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and the case was heard by 
Judge Hellerstein of the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York.346 In support of this motion, the defendants 
argued that, at the time of the WTC disaster response, the named 
plaintiffs were NYC, NYS, or federal government employees, and 
therefore, workers’ compensation laws or federal immunities bar 
their suits.347 Furthermore, the defendants rejected the plaintiffs’ 
assertion that a constitutional tort remedy existed and, like in 
Benzman, argued that even if the court held that such a claim was 
valid, the defendants would be entitled to a qualified immunity 
defense.348 
On February 3, 2007, the court granted the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss for plaintiff’s failure to state a claim.349 The court found 
unpersuasive the plaintiffs’ argument that a clearly established 
constitutional right had been violated and noted that Bivens and its 
progeny concern police misconduct, false arrest, improper searches 
and seizures, and freedom of speech fact violations.350 The court 
found the Bivens cases were not equivalent to a claim seeking 
                                                           
343 Id. at 74–75. 
344 Id. at 84–85. 
345 Id. at 76. 
346 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff’s Complaint, Lombardi v. 
Whitman, No. 04-CV-9272, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4464 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 
2006), aff’d, 485 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2007). 
347 Id. 
348 Id. 
349 Summary Order, Lombardi v. Whitman, No. 06-CV-9272, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 4464 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2007). 
350 Philip E. Kamel & Peter R. Paden, Public Liability for Catastrophic 
Events, N.Y.L.J. 3, 6 (2006) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, In re Sept. 11 
Disaster Site Litigation, 21 MC 100, February 2, 2006 (“Tr.”))[sic]. 
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damages from a former EPA administrator: “[T]here is no clear 
statement that anyone has told me about nor I recognize myself 
that a constitutional right was being violated when Administrator 
Whitman issued the statement that she issued, regardless of 
whether it was true or not true.”351 The court saw an ordinary tort 
for which the government had not waived its immunity under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, and therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim was 
not actionable.352 
In explaining its reasoning, the court noted that the 
“administration had to deal with a situation of concern, of fear [for] 
safety, of a need to get on with [the] work of the community, to 
avoid an economic catastrophe as well as a physical catastrophe to 
the City of New York, and what was said was said.”353 The 
plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.354 
On April 19, 2007, a three judge panel of the Second Circuit 
unanimously affirmed the District Court’s dismissal.355 In an 
opinion written by Chief Judge Jacobs, the court held that 
“because the conduct at issue here does not shock the conscience, 
there was no constitutional violation.”356 
In an ominous sign for future appellate review of the Benzman 
decision, the court took issue with Benzman’s conclusion that the 
reassuring statements made by EPA officials in the same press 
releases were conscience-shocking based on the nature of EPA’s 
statutory mandate.357 The Second Circuit panel chided the District 
                                                           
351 Id. (quoting Tr. at 38). 
352 Id. 
353 Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Mot. 
To Dismiss Hr’g Tr. at 49, Lombardi v. Whitman, No. 04-CV-9272 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2006)). 
354 Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 74. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. at 85. 
357 Id. at 84. The court explained: 
The EPA is designated as the agency in our country to protect human 
health and the environment, and is mandated to work for a cleaner, 
healthier environment for the American people. The agency enforces 
regulations regarding pollution in our environment and the presence of 
toxic and hazardous substances, and has endorsed and promulgated 
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Court for focusing too narrowly on the EPA “without considering 
the other substantial government interests at stake.”358 The court 
further noted that government officials and agencies must often 
balance risks of harm when they make a policy decision, but that 
“a poor choice made by an executive official between or among the 
harms risked by the available options is not conscience-shocking 
merely because for some persons it resulted in grave consequences 
that a correct decision could have avoided.”359 Understanding that 
government officials might “default to silence in the face of the 
public’s urgent need for information” if they knew they would face 
a lawsuit for disseminating inaccurate information, the court opined 
that “when great harm is likely to befall someone no matter what a 
government official does, the allocation of risk may be a burden on 
the conscience of the one who must make such decisions, but does 
not shock the contemporary conscience.”360 
CONCLUSION 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center triggered 
unprecedented responses on the part of government and the private 
sector. Together with the rescue, recovery and cleanup operations 
that began on September 11, 2001, efforts aimed at compensating 
victims of the attacks through insurance, charitable giving and 
government aid also got underway almost immediately after the 
attacks.361 Later, many disaster rescue, recovery, and cleanup 
responders filed tort claims, some of which are still in litigation.362 
Nearly seven years after the terrorist attacks, some 
                                                           
regulations for hazardous and toxic materials, such as asbestos and lead. 
As head of the EPA, Whitman knew of this mandate and took part in 
and directed the regulatory activities of the agency. Given this 
responsibility, the allegations in this case of Whitman’s reassuring and 
misleading statements of safety after the September 11, 2001 attacks are 
without question conscience-shocking. Id. 
358 Id. at 84. 
359 Id. at 85. 
360 Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 84–85 (2d Cir. 2007). 
361 See supra Part III. 
362 See supra Part III.D. 
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firefighters,363 other disaster responders and volunteers,364 and 
some occupants of nearby residences, commercial buildings, and 
schools have developed symptoms from their World Trade Center 
exposures.365 Medical evidence indicates an elevated prevalence of 
aerodigestive and mental health problems in some members of these 
populations exposed to debris, dust and smoke from the World 
Trade Center.366 Medical monitoring of all exposed populations, 
together with the medical treatment for those whose illnesses can 
be qualitatively linked to their World Trade Center exposures, is 
necessary to determine the true, long term health effects resulting 
from the WTC disaster and to provide compassionate care for 
those who still suffer ill health from the WTC disaster. 
Compensation mechanisms that were employed in the weeks 
and months following the terrorist attacks—insurance, charitable 
giving, and government aid—were an important way to make 
victims whole again and should receive serious study and 
evaluation as models for handling future terrorist events. The role 
of tort remedies in the September 11, 2001 terrorist disaster 
remains uncertain, but that role should also be subject to evaluation 
as it comes into better focus. Scholarly study and evaluation of the 
medical and legal ramifications of the World Trade Center disaster 
is as important as our current federal, state, and municipal efforts 
to prepare for and respond to another terrorist attack. 
 
                                                           
363 See supra Part II.A. 
364 See supra Part II.B. 
365 See supra Part II.D. 
366 See supra Part II. 
